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Abstract 
In scholarly literature, it is widely acknowledged that ‘the shadow of hierarchy’, 
hence the threat of disadvantageous Community legislation, is an important con-
cept in European social dialogue (ESD), where European social partners – that is 
organised labour and management – are given the chance to negotiate binding 
agreements on some aspects of European labour and social policy. While the 
shadow of hierarchy’s role for making social partners enter ESD (“negotiate or we 
legislate!”) is widely acknowledged, this paper aims at presenting a theoretical 
model that can explain the hitherto omitted question of how the shadow of hierar-
chy influences ESD agreements’ content.  
The thesis proceeds in a three-steps-process: firstly, an initial model is developed 
deductively, based on theories about European governance, veto games and inte-
grative bargaining. Secondly, structured and analysed by these theoretical consid-
erations, an analytic narrative is conducted to test the model against the case study 
of the successful 1998/99 European social dialogue negotiations on fixed-term 
work contracts. Thirdly, based on the analytic narrative’s findings, the initial 
model is refined.  
This study suggests that there is not the shadow looming over ESD negotiations, 
but a multitude of different shadows that influence ESD outcomes by promoting 
the use of specific strategies to change contents in order to suspend the others’ 
veto power. The shadow of hierarchy forms a reference point against which utility 
gains from proposals of the other side are measured and thus constitutes an impor-
tant reference frame for utility calculations wherein the other shadows can oper-
ate. 
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1 Introduction 
Social partners – that is the peak associations of management and labour (Keller, 
2003, p. 411) – not only play an important role in many of the European Union 
(EU) member states’ economic, labour and social policies, but also within the 
governance structure of the EU itself. Art. 152-155 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the EU (TFEU) explicitly mention the role of the social partners in the EU, 
more precisely, their role in European social dialogue (ESD).  
At European level the most important social partners at intersectoral level are the 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) on the employees’ side and the 
Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederation of Europe (UNICE, since 2007 
BusinessEurope) being the biggest organisation and the European Centre of En-
terprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Inter-
est (CEEP) and since 1999 also the European Association of Craft, Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises (UEAPME) on the employers’ side  (Keller, 2003, p. 
412). 
Social dialogue is an integral part of the “European social model” of a socioeco-
nomic system where economic and social progress are inseparable (Commission 
of the European Communities, 1994). Involving organised labour and manage-
ment into all phases of policy-making is considered to be part of ‘good govern-
ance’ (Falkner, 2003, p. 26). Social dialogue is a unique European form of gov-
ernance that is mostly unknown in other industrial relations systems outside the 
EU (Welz, 2008, p. 2; Bercusson, 1994, p. 20). 
 
Under ESD, the European Commission (hereafter “the Commission”) understands 
“discussions, consultations, negotiations and joint actions involving organisations 
representing the two sides of industry (employers and workers). It takes two main 
forms: 
- a tripartite dialogue involving the public authorities, 
- a bipartite dialogue between the European employers and trade union or-
ganisations. This takes please (sic!) at cross-industry level and within sec-
toral social dialogue committees.” (European Commission, n.d.). 
Cross-industry, (or also: cross-sectoral, intersectoral or interprofessional) social 
dialogue covers the whole economy and labour market and its purpose is to pro-
mote dialogue between trade unions and employers’ organisations in key areas 
common to all fields of employment and social affairs  (Eurofound, 2012), while 
sectoral social dialogue consists of negotiations between the European trade un-
ions and employer organisations of a specific sector of the economy  (Eurofound, 
2012). 
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These interactions can lead to legally binding agreements (Eurofound, 2012). That 
is why some scholars speak of European collective bargaining as “negotiated leg-
islation” or the “privatisation of the legislative process” (Welz, 2008, p. 302). 
European collective agreements can be concluded through four procedures 
(Smismans, 2008, p. 161f.; Léonard, Erne, Marginson, Smismans, & Tilly, 2007, 
p. 15): Management and labour’s collective bargaining can either be triggered by 
a Commission consultation or on the initiative of the social partners themselves. 
In both cases, if the European social partners reach an agreement, they can either 
request the Commission and the Council to adopt their agreement by a Council 
Directive that has the same effect as European law and is binding for all Member 
States, or the social partners can decide to implement agreements reached them-
selves by relying on means and instruments of industrial relations available to 
their member organisations at the national level. The latter kind of agreements do 
not form part of EU law. 
 
The current ESD regime was established under the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and 
the Protocol on Social Policy annexed to it. Impetus for the formalisation of ESD 
came in the 1980s: Due to constant vetoes by the United Kingdom’s government, 
the European Community was caught in stalemate in social policies that required 
unanimity decisions at that time (Bercusson, 1992, p. 178). Together with the 
creation of the single European market, the so-called Val Duchesse dialogue was 
launched by the incoming Commission President Jacques Delors: Negotiations 
between workers’ and employers’ organisations at Community level should ac-
company economic market integration as a crucial pillar of the European social 
model (Bercusson, 1994, p. 20). Hence, the 1986 Single European Act’s Article 
118b stipulates that “[t]he Commission shall endeavour to develop the dialogue 
between management and labour at European level, which could, if the two sides 
consider it desirable, lead to relations based on agreement”. However, this proce-
dure’s regulatory impact was modest as it only resulted in some non-binding joint 
opinions of management and labour (Léonard, Erne, Marginson, Smismans, & 
Tilly, 2007, p. 9). This “corporatist decision gap” (Streeck, 1995) ended after a 
“fundamental change in European labour law” (Bercusson, 1992, p. 177) that oc-
curred in 1993 when the Agreement on Social Policy was annexed to the Maas-
tricht Treaty (Leiber, 2005, p. 22f.). The Agreement was a result of European so-
cial partner negotiations and demands the Commission to obligatorily consult the 
European social partners regarding initiatives in the social policy field. The 
Agreement has further been institutionalised by incorporation into the Amsterdam 
(1999) and Nice (2001) Treaties (then Articles 137-139 of the former TEC) and 
the current Lisbon Treaty (Articles 153-155 TFEU, as well as a new Article 152 
TFEU) (Clauwaert, 2011, p. 170). 
Only after the institutionalisation of ESD under the Maastricht Treaty, the social 
partners managed to conclude agreements that became legally binding texts.  
 
As early as in 1992, Bercusson (1992, p. 185) argued that the new provisions in-
troduced under the Maastricht Treaty and its annex will lead to a greater willing-
ness of the European social partners to enter negotiations at European level and to 
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conclude collective agreements in order to avoid legislation purely made by the 
European institutions that might “pre-empt their autonomy, and which may be 
also a less desirable result” (Bercusson, 1992, p. 185). This is what Bercusson 
(1992, p. 185) called negotiations in the “shadow of the law” and Smismans 
(2008) “shadow of hierarchy”: The social partners only have an incentive to come 
to an agreement at European level when they have to fear an (unbeneficial) legis-
lative intervention by the Commission and the subsequent Council implementa-
tion, following the motto: “negotiate or we legislate!” (Goetschy, 2005). After 
Maastricht, this threat became more realistic compared to the preceding years be-
cause the EU’s new legal foundation provided for an expanded legal scope in the 
social policy realm and increased the ability of the Union to develop social law:  
Firstly, the Agreement on Social Policy introduced new areas where the Commu-
nity could become active in this policy field. Secondly, it stipulated that in some 
fields of social policy, qualified majority voting will be introduced. And lastly, a 
protocol was attached to the Agreement on Social Policy, granting the integration-
sceptical UK an opt-out in the field of European social policy (Bercusson, 1992, 
p. 182ff.; Bercusson, 1994, p. 1ff.). 
A couple of years later, after some agreements have been concluded 
within the ESD, other scholars agreed that the “shadow of the law”, or “shadow of 
hierarchy” was crucial in bringing both sides of industry together (Keller, 2008, p. 
208; Smismans, 2008; European Social Observatory, 2011, pp. 16, 80; Keune & 
Marginson, 2012, p. 9f.). The shadow is considered to be the strongest in Com-
mission-initiated and Council-implemented collective agreements (COCOCAs) as 
they result from a Commission initiative and are legally enforceable due to their 
incorporation into EU law through transposition into a Directive (see table 1) 
(Smismans, 2008, p. 161ff.). 
 
Table 1. Four procedural types of European collective agreements and degree of 
shadow of hierarchy (Smismans, 2008, p. 163) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consequently, the “shadow of hierarchy” is an important concept in ESD. While 
there seems to be consensus that the shadow is an important incentive for Euro-
pean social partners to enter ESD negotiations, it remains a theoretical puzzle how 
the shadow of hierarchy influences European social partners’ collective agree-
ments in ESDs content-wise.  
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The scholarly literature only shows tentative notions, but no coherent theoretical 
explanations. Keller and Sörries (1999, p. 121) note that the social partners’ 
agreements were made on “some selected, consensual parts of the original pack-
age only”, leaving the future of regulation of the more controversial, excluded 
components of the proposals open. Furthermore, provisions often are quite flexi-
ble because of the need to reconcile “existing and lasting (statutory) differences 
between member states including their ‘customs and practices’” and because this 
flexibilisation provides for the opportunity for national social partners to lobby 
during the transposition phase (Keller, 2003, p. 416). Bercusson (1992, p. 185) 
predicts that ESD would result in agreements which allow for derogations from 
specified standards through flexibilisation of provisions. These observations hint 
at a predominance of what will later be called ‘elimination strategy’ under ESD 
negotiations. However, these studies do not clearly state how and if these out-
comes can be connected to the shadow of hierarchy. 
Thus, this study’s purpose is to fill this gap by proposing a model that shall 
explain how the shadow of hierarchy influences European social dialogue agree-
ments’ content. The thesis proceeds in a three-steps-process of deductive theory-
building, empirical theory-testing and finally refinement of the initial theory. 
 
In the next chapter, I will describe the COCOCA procedure and the interests of 
the veto players involved in more detail in order to locate where the shadow of hi-
erarchy operates in this process. Then, I will deductively theorise how the shadow 
of law affects COCOCAs’ substance by drawing on rational choice institutional-
ism literature, namely on Tsebelis’ (2000; 2002) veto player theory and Tsebelis’ 
and Hahm’s (2013) theory of consensus strategies. 
Thereafter, the methods for data collection and data analysis will be ex-
plained in chapter three. Therefore, the analytic narrative approach and its rela-
tionship with game theory and causal mechanisms as well as the motivation for 
case selection will be pointed out. This chapter should not be seen in clear separa-
tion to the foregoing one. Rather, by laying down the mechanism-based approach, 
it also specifies the theoretical model. 
Structured by and analysed through the theoretical considerations of the 
paper’s first part, an analytic narrative of the 1998/99 ESD negotiations on fixed-
term work contracts will be presented in chapter four that serves as a plausibility 
test of the deduced model and is the starting point for further refinement of the 
theory. 
Finally, chapter five draws some conclusions by proposing refinements of 
the initial model, making suggestions for further research and discussing the 
study’s internal and external validity.  
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2 Theorising about the shadow of hier-
archy in European social dialogue 
This chapter will describe the legal foundations and practices that lead from a 
Commission proposal to a Council Directive, as well as the general (non-)interests 
of the social partners in the Europeanisation of labour and social law. From this 
description, it becomes apparent that the shadow of hierarchy is necessary to 
make industry and labour enter ESD negotiations. Then, from veto player theory 
and the assumptions that policies are multidimensional and dividable, a model is 
deduced that explains how the shadow of hierarchy is supposed to affect the shape 
of ESD outcomes. 
2.1 Procedures, social partners’ interests and shadow 
of hierarchy as resilience breaker in COCOCAs 
The procedure of Commission-initiated and Council-implemented collective 
agreements as enshrined in Art. 154-155 TFEU (formerly Art. 138-139 EC) is of a 
“double nature” (Schulz, 2003, pp. 164, as cited by Welz (2008, p. 289)): The 
process involves a dialogue between the Commission and the social partners and a 
dialogue between the social partners themselves.  
According to Art. 154 TFEU, the Commission is obliged to consult the social 
partners twice on its policy proposals in the field of social policy.  
In a first step, “the Commission shall consult management and labour on the pos-
sible direction of Union action” (Art. 154(2) TFEU). This consultation is thus 
about the “whether and how” (Welz, 2008, p. 290) of a possible EU action in this 
policy field. 
In a second step, if the Commission considers Union action necessary after this 
consultation, it has to consult the social partners again, this time on the content of 
its action (Art. 154(3) TFEU). For that purpose, the Commission forwards con-
crete policy proposals or suggestions of principles to be negotiated to the social 
partners (Welz, 2008, p. 295).  
The social partners then can inform the Commission of their mutual wish to initi-
ate the process provided for in Art. 154(4) TFEU and 155(1) TFEU, which leads 
to bilateral negotiations between the social partners and can lead to an agreement 
that “shall be implemented […] at the joint request of the signatory parties, by a 
Council decision on a proposal from the Commission” (Art. 155(2) TFEU). In 
their bilateral negotiations based on the Commission proposal, management and 
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labour, while being bound to the subject of the draft, are free to change its content 
to a certain degree (Welz, 2008, p. 300).  
The Commission is obliged to forward the social partners’ agreement negotiated 
under Art. 154-155 TFEU to the Council (Welz, 2008, p. 317). The Commission 
committed itself not to change the content of the agreement when proposing it for 
implementation via Council Directive (Smismans, 2008, p. 168) after it has exer-
cised its right and duty to check the agreements on grounds of representativeness 
of the negotiating parties, legality, impact on small and medium-sized enterprises 
and the appropriateness and necessity (Smismans, 2008, p. 168; Welz, 2008, p. 
317ff.). 
The Council, respecting the social partners’ “contractual autonomy” (Léonard, 
Erne, Marginson, Smismans, & Tilly, 2007, p. 12), can only transpose the agree-
ment into a legally binding and enforceable Directive without amending it. Should 
the Council intend to substantially change the collective agreement, the Commis-
sion will withdraw the proposal from the legislative process (Welz, 2008, p. 300; 
Smismans, 2008, p. 168). Thus, the Council’s role – usually the centre of the Un-
ion polity – is reduced to one of an “Erfüllungsgehilfe” (servant) (Welz, 2008, p. 
234). 
The European Parliament is formally not involved in this procedure (Welz, 2008, 
p. 235). 
During these social partners’ negotiations which “shall not exceed nine months, 
unless the management and labour concerned and the Commission decide jointly 
to extend it” (Art. 154(4) TFEU), the Commission has to refrain from any legisla-
tive action in that field (Welz, 2008, p. 298). If the social partners fail to conclude 
an agreement, however, the Commission can proceed via the normal legislative 
procedure with that matter (Welz, 2008, p. 300). 
The procedure is depicted in figure 1.  
 
While the Commission faces certain obligations in this procedure, the social part-
ners’ position is characterised by voluntarism: firstly, because management-labour 
negotiations cannot begin without mutual consent and, secondly, because “neither 
party is obliged to agree” on a final policy (Bercusson, 1992, p. 186). Any party 
can decide to defect from ESD at any time. 
This voluntarism comes along with divergent interests of management and 
labour. The European Community’s 1992 Single European Market program al-
lowed enterprises heretofore operating in a national market to compete with others 
in other Member States. This possibility to compete Europe-wide more easily put 
the Member States’ national systems of labour law and social protection under 
pressure: Enterprises could now easily relocate their production from one member 
state to another with lower direct (wages) and indirect (costs of complying with 
labour standards and of contributing to social protection schemes) labour costs. 
This “social regime competition” was threatening to cause “social dumping”: 
Member States might be pressured to lower labour and social standards in order to 
decrease indirect labour costs and in order to attract business (Bercusson, 1996, p. 
75). 
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Trade unions therefore strive for the introduction of Europe-wide labour and so-
cial standards in order to avoid a race to the bottom whose price workers had to 
pay (Bercusson, 1996, p. 77). The ETUC as the workers’ representative body thus 
has a firm interest in European-level bargaining in order to develop the social di-
mension of the internal market (Welz, 2008, p. 146; Keller & Sörries, 1999, p. 
115).  
Employers on the other hand, favour inactivity of the European institutions re-
garding European labour and social policies. They thus pursue a deregulatory 
agenda where Community non-action would lead to a lowering of national labour 
and social standards due to regime competition, and where manufacturers could 
pick-and-choose those markets that were the cheapest for their production 
(Bercusson, 1996, p. 77; Dufresne, Degryse, & Pochet, 2006, p. 11; Keller & 
Sörries, 1999, p. 115).  
On its own, however, the ETUC is unlikely to be able to force the employ-
ers’ organisations to the negotiation table due to a lack of bargaining power: Be-
cause the feeling of “labour solidarity” is still not strongly developed among 
ETUC member organisations and due to the huge numbers of member organisa-
tions, “the basic instrument of class struggle, such as a strike, are particularly dif-
ficult to develop at the European level” (Smismans, 2008, p. 165). 
 
Consequently, considering the ETUC’s weak bargaining position together with 
the management associations’ preference for European non-action and the volun-
tary nature of the Art. 154-155 TFEU procedure (hence the possibility to reject the 
entry into negotiations and also to reject the conclusion of an agreement), the 
shadow of hierarchy is necessary to get both sides of industry to sit together at the 
negotiation table: “European social dialogue is likely to lead to results only under 
the threat of legislative action. Only if management faces the risk of binding and 
more demanding provisions [note: in the sphere of labour and social standards] 
will it have an incentive to negotiate with labour” (Smismans, 2008, p. 165). 
Thus, the Commission’s proposals for social legislation are the “stimulus” to 
break resilience in ESD (Bercusson, 1994, p. 22). 
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Figure 1. The European Social Dialogue (adapted from Best (2003, p. 6)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 How does the shadow of hierarchy affect policy 
substance in European social dialogue? 
After the shadow of hierarchy’s influence on making social partners enter ESD 
negotiations was elucidated on the previous pages, a possible explanation for how 
the shadow of hierarchy influences the content of Commission-initiated and 
Council-implemented collective agreements will be developed in the following.  
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2.2.1 Governance structures and processes 
Börzel (2010) places ESD’s policy-making procedure within the discussion about 
European governance. Drawing on her use of the term “governance”, it will be 
understood as “institutionalised modes of co-ordination through which collec-
tively binding decisions are adopted and implemented” (Börzel, 2010, p. 194). 
From this definition it follows that “governance consists of both structure and 
process [own emphasis]. Governance structures relate to the institutions and actor 
constellations while governance processes are modes of social co-ordination by 
which actors adjust their behaviour” (Börzel, 2010, p. 194). 
Structures and processes are “inherently interlinked” as “institutions constitute 
arenas for social coordination and regulate their access” and they also “promote 
specific modes of co-ordination. They provide a ‘possibility frontier’ (Möglich-
keitsgrenze)” (Börzel, 2010, p. 196). 
Ideal typically, governance structures can be divided into hierarchical and 
non-hierarchical (competition and negotiation) types (Börzel, 2010, p. 194).  
In hierarchical governance, public authorities are the actors. On the other hand, 
non-hierarchical governance “brings together public actors with representatives of 
business and/or societal interests” or private actors alone (Börzel, 2010, p. 195).  
While the hierarchical governance’s process is characterised by the possibility 
that hierarchical actors can “force actors to act against their self-interest” (Börzel, 
2010, p. 195), non-hierarchical social co-ordination can be described as “deliber-
ate compliance” (Börzel, 2010, p. 196): The actors involved reach voluntary 
agreements that are the result of bargaining (“negotiating a compromise and 
granting mutual concessions […] on the basis of fixed preferences” (Börzel, 2010, 
p. 196)) or of arguing (“non-manipulative persuasion […] through which they de-
velop common interests and change their preferences accordingly” (Börzel, 2010, 
p. 196). 
In the EU however, these ideal types seldom show, rather, there are gov-
ernance mixes where different rule structures are embedded into one polity 
(Börzel, 2010, p. 197). Thereby, one structure can dominate the other(s): “The 
dominant rule structure sets or changes the rules of the game for the subordinate 
rule structure and entitles actors to intervene in order to correct or substitute pol-
icy outcomes. As a result, the primary rule structure casts an institutional shadow 
which has a significant influence on the behaviour of actors in the secondary rule 
structure” (Börzel, 2010, p. 197). 
In ESD, the Commission’s and Council’s possibility of going the ‘ordi-
nary’ legislative route to pass social legislation is the primary, hierarchical rule 
structure that sheds the shadow of hierarchy, while the social partners’ possibility 
for “private self-coordination” (Börzel, 2010, p. 201) forms the non-hierarchical 
secondary rule structure. Thus, Commission/Council intervention constitutes a 
“fall-back regulatory option” (Knill & Lenschow, 2003, p. 8). 
 
Smismans (2008) explains the power relationship between these two structures in 
ESD through the application of principal-agent theory. In this theory, the Com-
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mission is the principal that delegates the task of drafting social policy to an 
agent, namely European management and labour (Smismans, 2008, p. 163). 
However, this delegation is unclear and rather implicit and the regulatory 
task is not well-defined: Accounting for their autonomy, the social partners are 
free to decide whether to take up negotiations and they are not bound on what 
they want to negotiate. Also, they are free to deviate from the initial Commission 
proposal. Furthermore, delegation is not simply directed towards one agent, but 
towards the two sides of industry with opposing interests. The success of delega-
tion is thus dependent on whether the social partners can find consensual agree-
ment among themselves (Smismans, 2008, p. 167). 
The Commission possesses some means to control its agents and to coun-
teract these ambiguities: The social partners only have time for nine months to 
come to an agreement (unless it is unanimously extended on the social partners’ 
and the Commission’s agreement) and moreover, the Commission has the right to 
check social partners’ texts on grounds of some criteria listed above (Smismans, 
2008, p. 167). These control mechanisms, however, are rather weak for political 
reasons. Firstly, the Commission committed itself not to change texts concluded 
by management and labour and to withdraw the initiative if the Council should in-
tend to do so. Secondly, the social partners may lose the interest in using the ESD 
in the future should the Commission refuse to forward their agreement to the 
Council (Smismans, 2008, p. 169). 
Consequently, “[t]he procedure to COCOCAs is […] characterised by an 
unclear, nearly implicit delegation to agents who have broad room for interpreting 
the delegated regulatory task but who have to come to a common agreement” 
(Smismans, 2008, p. 169). 
 
Drawing an interim conclusion, one can say that, following Smisman’s (2008) ar-
gument, after management and labour have once taken up bipartite negotiations 
on an initiative of the Commission, the Commission itself exerts no direct influ-
ence on the social partners’ agreement’s content but that the two sides of industry 
enjoy a considerable room for manoeuvre in their negotiations. Thus, more impor-
tant is the social partners’ ability to reach a common position on social policy 
matters in order not to trigger the “fall-back regulatory option” (Knill & 
Lenschow, 2003, p. 8) in the form of the primary institutional rule structure of hi-
erarchical EU institutions’ decision-making. The social partners’ ability to reach a 
common position in turn, revolves around what the shadow of hierarchy looks 
like, hence what these actors expect the EU institutions to agree upon in case of 
management’s and labour’s failure to conclude a joint text. 
 
In what follows, a model will be developed that aims at explaining this procedure. 
Therefore, firstly, the “governance structure” will be conceptualised by referring 
to Tsebelis’ (2000; 2002) veto player theory. Thereafter, by drawing on Tsebelis’ 
and Hahm’s (2013) working paper on how to suspend vetoes, it will be described 
theoretically how this structure affects the “governance process” and consequen-
tially the negotiation outcome. 
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2.2.2 Theorising about governance structure: ESDs as veto games 
How can we understand the ESD governance structure, the “institutions and actor 
constellations” (Börzel, 2010, p. 194), in the shadow of hierarchy in COCOCAs? 
This paper will explain them by means of rational choice institutionalism. 
Rational choice institutionalism is a sub-form of rational choice theories that empha-
sises the constraining and empowering role of institutions for explaining outcomes in 
individual or collective decision-making. It rests on a number of premises (Pollack, 
2007, p. 32): 
a) individuals are the basic unit of social analysis (methodological individual-
ism): They have fixed and exogenously given preferences that they can rank transi-
tively according to their desirability. Individual and collective outcomes mirror the ac-
tors’ individual choices in an effort to 
b) maximise their own expected utility (“the outcome for all depends on the 
choice of each” (Levi, 1997, p. 26). Following a “logic of consequentiality”, rational 
actors estimate the expected utility of alternatives and chose the one that is most likely 
to maximise their utility in a situation where 
c) constraints might make the most desirable preference unrealistic to achieve. 
Constraints consist of scarcity and – most interestingly for institutionalists – institutions. 
According to Levi (1997, p. 25), “institutions are sets of rules (and sanctions) that 
structure social interactions and whose existence and applicability are commonly 
known within the relevant community. Institutions, so defined, structure the indi-
vidual choices of strategic actors so as to produce equilibrium outcomes, that is 
outcomes that no one has an incentive to alter”.  
Hence, institutions are an independent variable “that channel[s] individual choices 
into ‘institutional equilibria’” (Pollack, 2007, p. 33). 
 
For the analysis of political decision-making, some rational choice institutionalists 
have pointed out the role of unanimity rules that create ‘veto players’. Tsebelis 
(2000, 2002) explains the capacity of a political system to change policies by the exis-
tence and constellation of veto players. According to him (2000, p. 442), “[v]eto play-
ers are individual or collective decisionmakers whose agreement is required for the 
change of the status quo.” UNICE/BusinessEurope, CEEP and ETUC each are veto-
players, as the refusal to negotiate of each of them would lead to a breakdown of social 
partners’ involvement.  
These veto players are assumed to have Euclidian policy preferences with a cir-
cular indifference curve in an n-dimensional policy space, meaning that among any two 
points in a two- or more-dimensional policy space, they prefer the one which is the 
closest to their own ideal position (Tsebelis 2000, p. 443). If two alternatives have the 
same distance from her ideal point, the veto player is indifferent between these two 
(Tsebelis, 2002, p. 20). The veto player in figure 2 for example is indifferent between 
points X and Y because they are equally distant from its ideal, but it prefers them to 
point Z, while P is more desirable to it than any other proposal in the policy space. They 
hence have ‘transitive preferences’ (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 20).  
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Figure 2. Circular indifference curve for a veto player (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 20) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From this follows that a status quo can only change when a new policy proposal is 
closer to the ideal positions of all veto players compared to the status quo, because one 
veto player can easily block any decision when the policy proposals at the table are less 
favourable to them then the status quo. All points that all veto players prefer over the 
status quo (“the set of outcomes that can defeat the status quo” (Tsebelis 2002, p. 21)) 
are called the “winset of the status quo” (Tsebelis, 2000, p. 444) (see figure 3). A status 
quo is undefeatable if it is located within the “core” which is “the set of points with 
empty winset” (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 21). In figure 3, no status quo that is located in the 
triangular between veto players A, B and C could be defeated. This area thus constitutes 
the unanimity core with undefeatable policies. 
Consequently, the bigger the winset and the smaller the core – and hence the 
smaller the distances between the veto players – are, the more likely is a change of the 
status quo (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 25). 
 
Figure 3. Winset and core of a system with 3 veto players (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 22) 
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The concept of status quo will not be suitable for the cases under investigation. Rather, 
it will be helpful to speak of the “default outcome”. That is “the outcome when there is 
no agreement” by the veto players (Ostrom, 1986, p. 10). The default outcome in the 
case of COCOCAs is the initial Commission proposal and what management and 
labour expect the Council to make of it without social partners’ input. 
 
With this approach, it is not possible to predict the one outcome but to detect the range 
of outcomes that veto players could agree upon and hence the possibility and the likeli-
hood to change a status quo (Dehling, 2012, p. 159). Tsebelis does this because in a 
multi-dimensional policy space, a single equilibrium point (the one outcome) rarely ex-
ists. As his veto player theory shows, the equilibrium point is either the status quo when 
positioned in the core, or many equilibrium points exist at the same time (all possible 
outcomes within the winset) (Tsebelis, 2002, p. 9; Dehling, 2012, p. 159). 
Thus, Tsebelis’ veto player theory helps to understand why social partners in COCO-
CAs can reach an agreement among themselves despite their diverse interests and the 
voluntary nature of the procedure: It is because there can be a proposal on the table that 
all players prefer more than the default outcome. 
 
The next sub-chapter will illustrate how social partners can make the side being more 
disfavoured by a proposal than by the default outcome suspend its veto power: it is by 
drafting a new proposition in such a way that this player then prefers it over the default 
outcome. 
2.2.3 Theorising about governance processes: suspending vetoes in 
ESD by manipulating a policy’s dimensionality 
The leeway to modify legislative proposals granted to the social partners by the 
European institutions and the possibility to retreat to the shadow outcome enables 
a specific style of negotiations: ‘integrative’ bargaining which results in win-win 
solutions by ‘expansion of the pie’. The bargainers try to find common or com-
plementary interests in order to reach jointly beneficial, often creative and innova-
tive solutions. Negotiations are perceived as positive-sum games. By contrast, 
‘distributive bargaining’ forms the other end of the bargaining continuum: In per-
ceived zero-sum games where self-interest prevails over the search for common 
interests, the negotiators merely ‘divide the pie’, creating win-lose situations 
(Elgström & Jönsson, 2000, p. 685f.; Sannerstedt, 2005, p. 99). In ESD, according 
to Welz (2008, p. 373), integrative bargaining “clearly prevails” because no party 
would accept agreements that “bear negative effects for their affiliates” and thus 
“zero-sum or even negative-sum negotiations are not very likely”. The prospect of 
an integrative solution helps upholding the dialogue: The side of industry being 
less satisfied with the default outcome “naturally has a stronger incentive to nego-
tiate than the social partner, who sees its interests better safeguarded by the Com-
mission proposal” (Welz, 2008, p. 298f.). But also the better-off side stays at the 
negotiation table hoping for an even more advantageous outcome (Welz, 2008, p. 
299).  
  14 
To increase a proposal’s value for all parties involved and ultimately to suspend 
veto power for achieving an agreement among various actors with different pref-
erences, Tsebelis and Hahm (2013) identified three strategies that negotiators can 
apply in bargaining processes that create win-win solutions: compromise, com-
pensation and/or elimination. 
These strategies are based on two major assumptions: Negotiations take place in a 
multi-dimensional policy space and policies are dividable.  
Multidimensionality is assumed because the use of a single policy dimen-
sion might “not always be enough to convey even the big picture” (Benoit & 
Laver, 2006, p. 13). Rather, complicated issues would make the presumption of 
multiple underlying dimensions of contestation to show a “map of conflict” 
(Selck, 2004, p. 207) more realistic (Tsebelis, 2010, p. 8).  
These policy dimensions are not about “absolute values” but are of a “di-
vidable nature” which means that politics is not about “bipolar” yes or no deci-
sions, but that a “more” or “less” on a policy dimension is possible (Nawrat, 2012, 
p. 129). Furthermore, veto players’ policy positions are moveable. Thus, it is 
rather suitable to speak of ideal positions or preferences as understood as “the set 
of desires that motivate a given individual in a particular context” (Benoit & 
Laver, 2006, p. 15). If veto players were free from any restrictions, they would 
choose their ideal policy. But as they are involved in “social and political interac-
tions with others” that restrict this possibility (in the case at hand they are in-
volved in a veto game as described above), they have to adjust their behaviour 
within that context in order to reach an agreement as close as possible to their own 
ideal position (Benoit & Laver, 2006, p. 16).  
 
One of Tsebelis and Hahm’s (2013) consensus strategies aims at settling an 
agreement leaving the context unchanged. This is the compromise approach. Here, 
the final outcome is located in the space already determined by the pre-existing 
policy dimensions within which each actor has a different preference. Thus, the 
number of underlying dimensions is not altered (Tsebelis & Hahm, 2013, p. 19). 
This is only possible when a winset exists within which the compromise can be 
located.  
The number of policy dimensions is not fixed however. As explained pre-
viously, the social partners enjoy considerable discretion to deviate from the ini-
tial Commission proposal. Hence, the ESD procedure allows for the addition and 
subtraction of policy issues. Mathematically, there can be an infinite number of 
dimensions (and Tsebelis emphasises that his veto player theory’s “conclusions 
hold in any number of dimensions” (2002, p. 156)). It is only for practical reasons 
that mostly a maximum of three dimensions is used because this is what human 
beings can “easily visualize” (Benoit & Laver, 2006, p. 20). 
Accordingly, the other two consensus approaches, compensation and elimination, 
aim at manipulating the context of the negotiations via increasing or decreasing 
the dimensionality of the dispute.  
The compensation strategy entails an addition of dimensions to achieve 
agreement: “One actor in (some of) the existing dimensions gets compensated by 
the introduction of new dimensions. This satisfies the would-be losers, and entices 
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them to accept the deal.” (Tsebelis & Hahm, 2013, p. 19). Through introducing 
favourable new items to an agreement or separating previously combined items, 
an actor gets compensated that would otherwise consider the outcome to be harm-
ful to its self-interest (Tsebelis & Hahm, 2013, p. 13). For example, agreement on 
a defense budget can be facilitated by dividing it into sub-budgets for the army, 
navy, aviation, marines, etc. (Tsebelis & Hahm, 2013, p. 19). 
Conversely, elimination strategy consists of decreasing the number of un-
derlying policy dimensions to achieve agreement by eliminating dimensions of 
disagreement. This can happen by “removing something from the initial docu-
ment” (Tsebelis & Hahm, 2013, p. 21) in two ways: On the one hand, ambiguity 
can be increased (decreasing precision) “so that different behaviours can be con-
sidered as consistent with the text” (Tsebelis & Hahm, 2013, p. 21). On the other 
hand, some of the debate’s issues can be discarded altogether “in which case dif-
ferent behaviours are obviously permissible” (Tsebelis & Hahm, 2013, p. 21). 
Compensation and elimination can create a winset or change the size of a 
winset and the core (Tsebelis & Hahm, 2013, p. 19), as can be seen in the SQ1 
situation in figure 3. It shows a situation where veto players have to make a deci-
sion on a two-dimensional question. As the existence of a winset indicates, there 
is the possibility to reach unanimous agreement. But, had the veto players to de-
cide on each of the two dimensions separately, the status quo would have survived 
in both dimensions because in both decisions, veto players’ ideal position were 
located ‘left’ and ‘right’ of the status quo and thus at least one player always pre-
fers the status quo to any other ideal position of the other actors located on the one 
dimension (see figure 4). Thus, the addition of a second issue helped making una-
nimity feasible. 
 
Figure 4. Defeating status quo 1 in a two-dimensional decision situation 
(Tsebelis, 2002, p. 22) vs. survival of status quo 1 when the same dimensions are 
decided separately (own depiction) 
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2.2.4 Connecting structures, processes and outcomes in COCOCAs 
Summing up, how is the shadow of hierarchy expected to affect  the content of 
social partners’ agreements in European social dialogue’s COCOCAs? The previ-
ous sections demonstrated that the ESD’s governance structure constitutes a 
Möglichkeitsraum (possibility room) for the actors involved in it: When entering 
the second stage of social partner consultation in ESD, the two sides of industry 
have to proof their ability to reach consensus. This crucially depends on what they 
expect the EU institutions to do in case of social partners’ non-agreement. The 
Commission’s labour and social law proposal and what the social partners expect 
to be made of it by the Council thus constitutes the shadow of hierarchy. It is the 
reference point to which labour and management compare proposals for agree-
ment of the other side of industry with. They compare their potential utility gains 
from this proposal with the benefits they would attain from the default outcome. 
Hence, veto player theory helps to understand the institutionally-based possibility 
of ending the political labour-management process.  
These structures “promote specific modes of coordination” (Börzel, 2010, p. 196): 
While the ESD institutions allow for a quick death of veto players’ interaction, at 
the same time, the social partners are granted a room for manoeuvre. This opens 
the door to steer the negotiation process towards a successful route: Content-wise, 
the social partners are not strictly bound to the Commission proposal. While they 
can try to find a compromise amongst the issues introduced by the Commission, 
they are also free to add new ones (compensation strategy) or subtract items from 
the agenda (elimination strategy) in order to strike a joint-deal. This modification 
of the Commission text is not happening arbitrarily, but again derives from a 
comparison by management and labour of the default outcome with a newly in-
troduced proposal by the respective other social partner. 
Consequentially, structures and processes are “inherently interlinked” (Börzel, 
2010, p. 196). That way, the default outcome, or as it was previously called in 
ESD literature, the shadow of hierarchy, significantly affects the final shape and 
thus the outcome of the EU’s social and labour legislation in ESD. 
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3 Methodology: or how to tell a con-
vincing story 
In the previous chapter, a game theoretical model that aims at explaining how the 
shadow of hierarchy in ESD influences the content of European social partners’ 
collective agreements was deductively formulated. This model is “a schematic 
statement of a theoretical argument, a hypothesized parsimonious abstraction or 
simplification of “reality” that depicts a deductively sound, systematic, regular re-
lationship between specified aspects of reality and helps to explain that relation-
ship” (Büthe, 2002, p. 482). As will be pointed out in this chapter, this thesis’ data 
collection and data analysis is based on causal mechanisms that in combination 
with the rational choice approach promise to offer valuable insights into political 
processes. Because the role of rational choice theory in mechanism-based research 
will be explained in more detail, this chapter should not be seen as a clear cut 
from the previous ‘theory’ chapter, rather, it helps specifying the model. 
In the next chapter, this model will be exposed to empirical material of actual so-
cial partners’ negotiations. This chapter explains how this will be done. The aim is 
not to reject the model if it does not fit the data, hence falsification, but rather re-
formulation of the theoretical considerations that help to explain how Commission 
proposals influence COCOCAs’ substance (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & 
Weingast, 1998, p. 16). This empirical test will be conducted through a case 
study. 
A case study, according to Gerring (2004, p. 342) can be described as an 
“intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of 
units.” Case studies cannot reveal “true causal effects” but can “shed light on 
causal mechanisms” (Gerring, 2004, p. 349). Only experimental designs can re-
veal causal inferences as they can control for causal effects of variables other than 
the one of interest (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). By the intensive study of 
one case however (with its “characteristic style of evidence-gathering – over-time 
and within-unit variation” (Gerring, 2004, p. 349)), causal mechanisms that link 
the dependent and the independent variable should be identified. “Case studies 
[...] allow one to peer into the black box of causality to the intermediate causes ly-
ing between some cause and its purported effect. Ideally, they allow one to “see” 
X and Y interact” (Gerring, 2004, p. 348). 
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3.1 Measuring changes in dimensionality and the 
need for process-tracing 
As was shown previously, influence on COCOCA outcomes can be characterised 
by changes in the proposal’s dimensionality. How, then, can changes in dimen-
sionality be measured? Tsebelis and Hahm (2013) and Tsebelis (2013) present a 
method that is based on the assumption that agreements need to be reached among 
multiple dimensions of an underlying policy space. Within each dimension one of 
the three strategies of compromise (preservation of dimensionality), compensation 
(addition of dimensionality) or elimination (subtraction of dimensionality) can be 
applied “as a measurable variable which helps us [to see] how agreement was 
achieved” (Tsebelis and Hahm, 2013, p. 24). 
Very close attention needs to be paid to the meaning of words as the use of lan-
guage is supposed to be chosen deliberately by the negotiation parties. A change 
of words in different drafts of the agreement compared to the content of the de-
fault outcome that would most probably not find unanimity if it remained un-
changed implies a change of dimensions in order to make the proposal mutually 
agreeable (Tsebelis & Hahm, 2013, p. 44). 
In the compromise strategy, words are simply replaced by others that can 
be located on an issue continuum of the positions held by the negotiators (Tseblis 
& Hahm, 2013, p. 45). 
Compensation can be detected by the introduction of new concepts and 
new goals (Tsebelis & Hahm, 2013, p. 45, 48). When an “and” is replaced by an 
“or” compensation takes place because the text is “moving from an intersection to 
a union of content of the words involved” (Tsebelis & Hahm, 2013, p. 46). 
In the reversed form, the same is true for the elimination strategy (Tsebelis 
& Hahm, 2013, p. 46). According to Tsebelis (2013), elimination which aims at 
either reducing precision (increasing ambiguity) or restriction of scope (Tsebelis 
& Hahm, 2013, p. 45) is the most common strategy in EU politics to reach unani-
mous decisions. More detailed explanations of existing concepts hint at reduction 
of scope (Tsebelis & Hahm, 2013, p. 45). Specificity is reduced when words like 
“shall” or “always” are replaced with “may” or “most of the time”, or by replac-
ing high standards with lower ones (Tsebelis, 2013, p. 1091). Furthermore, a text 
becomes less specific when  
 “- the list of conditions increases (since the rule will be applied less often); 
- the number of goals is reduced (since the rule becomes less ambitious: if the bill 
is presented in positive mode, adding goals increases specificity; if it is worded in 
a negative way (specifying the exceptions), then adding exceptions decreases 
specificity); 
- the number of means is reduced (the bill becomes less effective); 
- the time of implementation is moved to the future.” (Tsebelis, 2013, p. 1092) 
This method entails two potential biases: Firstly, it might miss “hidden 
compensation” which are compromises that took place before the first draft or 
compromises across bills (Tsebelis & Hahm, 2013, p. 57). 
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Secondly, compromises might be underreported because the other two strategies 
(elimination and compensation) may also include compromises. However, in 
these cases, elimination and compensation will be seen as the “major strategic de-
vice to reach agreement” (Tsebelis & Hahm, 2013, p. 58). 
 
If it can be observed that the negotiation parties have diverging ideal positions and 
that the final agreement shows a change in dimensionality compared to the Com-
mission proposal, some rational choice theorists would probably consider this 
congruence of theoretical expectations and outcomes as being sufficient to claim 
causality because “a causal mechanism is implicit in the internal logic of [their] 
deductive theories and needs no further explication or demonstration if the theory 
generates successful predictions” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 203). However, 
congruency does not “constitute acceptable causal explanation” unless the causal 
effects of independent variables and causal mechanisms are proofed (George & 
Bennett, 2005, p. 208).   
As this thesis’ aim is to better understand the shadow of hierarchy’s impact on the 
negotiators, explicit reference will be made to causal mechanisms of ESD negotia-
tions by opening the “black box” of decision-making through the application of 
the process-tracing method – or, as will later be pointed out, a specific form of 
process-tracing that emphasises its theory-development component: analytic nar-
rative. 
3.2 Process-tracing through analytic narratives 
3.2.1 Game theory and causal mechanism 
Whereas correlations state that “if X, then Y”, causal mechanisms “provide for a 
more detailed and in a sense more fundamental explanation” by describing a 
“process (“X leads to Y through steps A, B, C”)” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 
141). The study at hand thus asks which steps (A, B, C) connect the Commis-
sion’s announcement to start the second stage of ESD negotiations (X) with the 
unanimous adoption of a final text that is mutually acceptable to both sides of in-
dustry (Y). Causal mechanisms combine three different types of social mecha-
nisms at different levels: situational mechanisms, action-formation mechanisms, 
and transformational mechanisms (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 95). 
The situational mechanism describes who the actors are in the game and 
what their positions are (Petersen, 1999; Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 96). The 
action-formation mechanism is about “theoretical micro-foundations, general as-
sumptions about the behavior of individuals” (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 95). 
The transformational mechanism finally outlines the institutional environment 
(Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 97), which in this paper was conceptualised as a 
veto game with the possibility of changing a policy proposal in order to reach 
consensus. 
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Ideally, these mechanisms should be meaningfully elucidated and con-
nected to each other: „A full-fledged mechanism-based explanation comprises a 
multilevel model based on generic social mechanisms at the micro level [note: ac-
tion-formation mechanism] and the links between the micro and macro levels 
[note: situational mechanism, transformational mechanism and output] of analysis 
and the specification of these three types of social mechanisms for the cases under 
investigation. Within such a multilevel model, each specified social mechanism 
has the status of a necessary condition for the outcome, and the combination of 
the different mechanisms is viewed as a sufficient condition for the outcome” 
(Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 97). 
Necessary condition means that “the outcome would not have occurred without 
this condition. Nevertheless, other factors have to be added to make the outcome 
actually occur. In other words, the existence of a necessary condition makes the 
outcome or the next step in a causal chain possible, but complementary or contex-
tual conditions must be included to explain why it actually occurred”  (Blatter & 
Haverland, 2012, p. 120). 
A factor is a sufficient condition if it “has been able to produce the next step in a 
causal chain or the final outcome without further causal factors. Therefore, the 
causal strength of a sufficient condition is higher than the causal strength of a nec-
essary condition within a causal chain”  (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 120). 
 
Therefore, game theory is a good means to „explain how changes in some macro-
level phenomenon […] led to changes in some other macro-level phenomenon 
[…]” (Eriksson, 2011, p. 40) because it “requires a specification of actors [note: 
situational mechanism], choices [note: transformational mechanism], and con-
straints/incentives [note: action-formation mechanism]” (Petersen, 1999, p. 65). It 
does so by providing a micro-level mechanism that makes assumptions about how 
rational actors would react upon changes in one macro-level phenomenon and 
how their change in behaviour thereby results in changes in social outcomes 
(Eriksson, 2011, p. 40). The rational choice theory’s micro-level thus step-by-step 
links causes to effects (Eriksson, 2011, p. 227). 
Consequentially, in game theory, the micro-level or action-formation mechanism 
comprises the concept of actors being homines oeconomici: They have “consistent 
preference rankings and aim at maximizing utility – and often that their utility 
consists of what is in their self-interest and/or that they calculate costs and bene-
fits carefully when making decisions” (Eriksson, 2011, p. 5).  
 
The shadow of hierarchy is to be placed within the situational mechanism. From 
there, it glares into all other following mechanisms of the causal chain: After the 
input (initial condition) of the Commission declaring its intention to become ac-
tive legislatively in a specific policy, this Commission’s initiative and what the 
social partners expect the Council to make of it (default outcome) forms an alter-
native outcome within the situational mechanism among all the proposals made 
by the social partners. In the action-formation mechanism, the social partners cal-
culate the expected utility of each proposal on the table, hence the Commission 
initiative as well as suggestions for amendments made by each side of industry, 
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and they rank them according to their respective preferences. Based on these as-
sessments, the transformational mechanism then results in the social partners’ 
moves to either accept or block proposals of one another and even to decide to 
stop negotiations or to offer counterproposals in the form of one of the three con-
sensus strategies identified earlier. Counterproposals then create feedback loops: 
They form new alternatives that become part of the situational mechanism, being 
again assessed in terms of utility maximisation compared to other alternatives and 
potentially leading to new proposals or rejection. These processes can result in the 
outcome of the adoption of a European collective agreement, or the failure of so-
cial partners’ dialogue on that policy. Figure 5 provides a schematic depiction of 
these hypothesised causal paths. 
 
Figure 5. Different types of social mechanisms that together form a causal 
mechanism (adapted from Blatter & Haverland (2012, p. 95)) 
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3.2.2 Analytic narrative 
One method to identify and explore mechanisms behind observed social phenom-
ena is process-tracing (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 147). It does so by employing 
“multiple types of evidence […] for the verification of a single inference – bits 
and pieces of evidence that embody different units of analysis […]” (Gerring, 
2007, p. 173). With the help of these materials, the researcher seeks to create a 
dense description of the processes under investigation: “By reading documents, 
laboring through archives, interviewing, and surveying the secondary literature, 
we seek to understand the actors’ preferences, their perceptions, their evaluation 
of alternatives, the information they possess, the expectations they form, the 
strategies they adopt, and the constraints that limit their actions. We then seek to 
piece together the story that accounts for the outcome of interest” (Bates, Greif, 
Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 1998, p. 12).  
The data collected is thus qualitative, which is especially well-suited to 
follow theoretical chains of reasoning and for “locating and tracing unexpected 
deviations” (Weiss, 1998, p. 86). 
Besides official documents like consultation papers, agreements and treaties, the 
data for this thesis will mostly stem from written internal ETUC communication: 
reports on negotiation rounds, email responses of national affiliates on new pro-
posals and propositions about how to react to the other camp’s moves. Interviews 
were not feasible, because the negotiations to be analysed took place in the late 
1990s and people’s memories usually are “surprisingly unreliable” (Weiss, 1998, 
p. 192). In order to meet the danger of a trade union bias of the material, secon-
dary literature on the chosen case will also be taken into consideration. However, 
with the exception of Ahlberg (2000), scholars (Falkner, 2011; Welz, 2008; 
Hartenberger, 2001; Léonard, Erne, Marginson, Smismans, & Tilly, 2007; 
Degryse, 2000; Keller & Bansbach, 2001; Falkner, 2003) have not gone deep into 
the negotiation process, but have described it rather anecdotally. Still, their ac-
counts provide a background understanding of the processes and the ETUC com-
munication available does not contradict these depictions, thus limiting the danger 
of a trade union bias. 
This approach is narrative because “it pays close attention to stories, ac-
counts, and context” (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 1998, p. 10). But 
it is also analytic in “extracting explicit and formal lines of reasoning, which fa-
cilitate both exposition and explanation” (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & 
Weingast, 1998, p. 10). In this paper, the narrative is structured by and interpreted 
through game theoretical considerations that propose mechanisms explaining how 
structures create incentives that shape individual choices and thus collective out-
comes. It is thus an analytic narrative. 
Through its analytic narrative, process-tracing tests can help to establish 
that “(1) a specific event or process took place, (2) a different event or process oc-
curred after the initial event or process, and (3) the former was a cause of the lat-
ter”  (Mahoney, 2012, p. 571). They can hence proof causal relationships: A 
causal relationship can only be established if a) X precedes Y, b) X correlates 
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with Y, and 3) the relationship between X and Y cannot be explained in terms of 
some third variable (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002, p. 6). 
In order to do so,  process-tracing embodies different kinds of approaches: 
a) hoop tests whereby it must be shown that the hypothesised cause and outcome 
(here divergent interests, a shadow of hierarchy and the use of one or more of the 
consensus strategies) occurred in order to warrant the model further consideration 
(Mahoney, 2012, p. 574f.), b) comprehensive storylines that present the “big pic-
ture” of the major steps and sequences of the overall process, c) smoking gun ob-
servations that “provide detailed descriptions of important moments and reveal 
close spatio-temporal connections between causes and effects” (Blatter & 
Haverland, 2012, p. 143), and d) confessions which are statements revealing the 
perceptions, motivations and anticipations of major actors (Bates, Greif, Levi, 
Rosenthal, & Weingast, 1998, pp. 119, 143). 
However, game theory will not be a strict guide on the application of these 
four process-tracing approaches. Rather, it serves as a theoretical anchor point 
(Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 1998, p. 692), a heuristic device that 
structures the narrative (Büthe, 2002, p. 487; Petersen, 1999, p. 61). Thus, the 
analytic narrative is an iterative approach that engages a dialogue between theory 
and data: “We begin all of our research with some basic information and some 
theoretical priors, then we accumulate new information and formulate new mod-
els” (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 1998, p. 694). Thereby, the 
method is also open for detecting alternative explanations that were not theorised 
a priori and that can enhance the models validity: “If the narrative cannot be writ-
ten in terms of the model, something is wrong with the model” (Büthe, 2002, p. 
487). Furthermore, it can help to avoid the aforementioned two biases of measur-
ing changes in dimensionality. 
The quality of conclusions drawn from process-tracing is highly dependent 
on the availability and accessibility of case material. With a lack of empirical ma-
terial, a dense description of the case’s processes – the very core of the process-
tracing method – is not possible and causal inferences become “provisional” 
(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 222; Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 25). 
3.3 Case selection 
The process-tracing method has implications for the case selection: Providing 
convincing narratives demands the collection of empirical material stemming 
from diverse sources and space to lay down the history of the case. Hence, for the 
sake of the narrative approach, I will not analyse all COCOCA negotiations 
(Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 100). Furthermore, accessibility of sources of in-
formation is a crucial criterion for case selection in process-tracing (Blatter & 
Haverland, 2012, p. 102). Also, the case shall be a positive one, hence where so-
cial partners were able to reach consensus, because the causal mechanism cannot 
be present in cases with a negative outcome, and hence these cases are not rele-
vant for theory-testing process-tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 2012, p. 14).  
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Considering that this paper only provides space for one process-tracing 
analysis of a COCOCA negotiation and that selection is based on the dependent 
variable, it will be opted for a least-likely case, a case where the outcome is posi-
tive even though the independent variables’ values would only “weakly predict an 
outcome or predict a low-magnitude outcome” (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 121). 
This approach allows to draw “Sinatra inferences” (Levy (2005, p. 144) as cited 
by Bennett & Elman (2006, p. 462)) that provide for a generalisability of the 
study’s findings: “If the theory can make it here, it can make it anywhere” 
(Bennett & Elman, 2006, p. 462). Thus, one successful COCOCA negotiation will 
be chosen, where the initial constellation of social partners’ ideal positions and the 
Commission proposal would have suggested highest likelihood of failure of reach-
ing unanimous agreement because one of the parties would have had a big incen-
tive to defect from the negotiation. Or, in Tsebelis’ veto player terminology, the 
case where either no winset was existent or where the winset was the smallest. So 
far, three COCOCAs have been concluded at cross-sectoral and six at secotral 
level ( (ETUI, 2013) and own counting based on Commission online data base). 
Of these successful cases, tensest negotiations have taken place in the 1998/99 in-
tersectoral negotiations on fixed-term work contracts (Welz, 2008; Falkner, 2003; 
Falkner, 2011). The social partners had very opposing stances on the Commission 
initiative and negotiations were about to break down twice due to these differ-
ences. Prospects for success were thus put into doubt at some points. However, af-
ter an extension of the negotiation deadline, the social partners reached an agree-
ment. ESD on fixed-term work contracts hence constitutes a good example for a 
least-likely case.  
One might wonder about the practical relevance of analysing an instance 
of cross-sectoral social dialogue, considering the facts that the case to be analysed 
was the last successful one of this kind and that the cross-sectoral social dialogue 
lies idle since the early 2000s. However, many scholars are of the opinion that 
European cross-sectoral dialogue is not dead but waits for a revitalisation by a 
Commission that is more European labour law-friendly than were the ones since 
the early 2000s (Keller, 2003, p. 426; Dufresne, Degryse, & Pochet, 2006, p. 11; 
Clauwaert, 2011, p. 174). 
This case is furthermore interesting because it puts issues of flexibility for 
employers versus security for employees centre-stage. As the Commission (2006) 
notes, these two principles constitute the main principles of contestation between 
labour and capital in most of ESD negotiations and thus offers insights being rele-
vant beyond the fixed-term work case: Employers, in order to remain competitive 
in the globalised economy, favour the development of flexible labour markets 
with its increasingly diverse contractual forms of employment in order to be able 
to swiftly adapt to consumer demands and to avoid costs of compliance with di-
rect and indirect employment costs, while this faces employees with employment 
and income insecurity and thus affects “the relative stability of the associated 
working and living conditions” (European Commission, 2006, p. 3ff.). Due to this 
important management-labour cleavage, an analysis of the fixed-term work con-
tract negotiations should therefore provide for a broader generalisability of find-
ings. 
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Moreover, for methodological reasons, these negotiations are well-suited 
to test and refine the model, because knowledge about the shadow of hierarchy is 
relatively concrete: the Commission has tried to regulate this policy since the be-
ginning of the 1980s. In 1994, the German Council Presidency made a last at-
tempt to pass legislation on that matter in the Council, but failed due to the UK’s 
veto. As will be shown, during the 1998/99 ESD negotiations, this German 1994 
draft proposal was perceived as a possible re-starting point for new Council nego-
tiations should the social partners’ talks fail. It thus constitutes the shadow of law. 
 
To sum up, this study conducts an analytic narrative of a least-likely case of CO-
COCA negotiations. It is thereby guided by causal mechanisms that are supposed 
to show a link between some macro phenomena and their micro foundations. It 
should thus reveal the link between ideal positions, the default outcome and stra-
tegic choices of the social partners that lead to the conclusion of a European col-
lective agreement. 
The aim is to gain insights into these processes in order to prove and/or refine the 
causal chain of the hypothised connection between mechanisms. 
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4 Theory asks data: a case study of 
ESD negotiations on fixed-term work 
In this chapter the ESD negotiations on fixed-term work contracts will be ana-
lysed in order to test and refine the veto game theoretical model developed in the 
first part of this paper.  
Therefore, first the road to the ESD on fixed-term work will be described. 
It will provide information about why the dialogue was started, the fundamentally 
divergent interests of both sides of industry on that matter as well as what formed 
the shadow of hierarchy in these negotiations, namely the German Presidency 
proposal on fixed-term work contracts from November 1994 and in parts the so-
cial partners’ agreement on part-time work from 1997 (initiating condition [in-
put]).  
Thereafter, the most controversial points of the negotiations will be ana-
lysed, that is the regulation of fixed-term contracts, non-discrimination of fixed-
term workers, information and consultation rights of employees’ representative 
bodies and temporary agency work. For each of these issues the ideal positions of 
management and labour will be outlined as well as what the respective shadow of 
these provisions looked like (situational mechanism).  
Then the negotiation process of each of these topics will be delineated 
looking at which proposals were put forward and how they were evaluated by 
each side, especially compared to the 1994 and 1997 texts (action-formation 
mechanism) and in the adoption of which consensus strategy this resulted (trans-
formational mechanism) that finally made the agreement adoptable for both sides 
of industry (result [outcome]). 
After that, an interim-conclusion follows with an assessment whether an 
influence of the shadow on the agreement’s content was detectable during the ne-
gotiation process by emphasising connecting lines between the different mecha-
nisms. 
4.1 The road to ESD on fixed-term work 
Community-wide regulation of “atypical” work contracts, that is work that devi-
ates from full-time contracts with permanent duration – was on the European 
Commission’s agenda since the early 1980s. Its first proposal for a Council Direc-
tive including the issue of fixed-term work originates from 1982 (Ahlberg, 2000, 
p. 46; Welz, 2008, p. 404). However, when the Council could not reach unani-
mous agreement on this proposal, the Commission withdrew its initiative in 1990 
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and introduced three new proposals the same year (Ahlberg, 2000, p. 46), on “cer-
tain employment relationships with regard to working conditions” (90/C 224/04), 
on “certain relationships with regard to distortions of competition” (90/C 224/05) 
where fixed-duration contracts were dealt with as one form of atypical work 
alongside with part-time work and temporary agency work, and on “measures to 
encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of temporary workers” 
(90/C 224/06). Only on the last one the Council could reach an agreement, trans-
posing it into a Council Directive (Ahlberg, 2000, p. 46). 
In November 1994, the then-German Council Presidency tabled a last 
compromise proposal for a Directive on fixed-term contracts. When it became 
clear, that this proposal would not gain unanimity among the national ministers, 
the General Secretary recommended to trigger the European social dialogue ac-
cording to Art. 138 and 139 TEC (today Art. 154 and 155 TFEU) (Hartenberger, 
2001, p. 126). 
The Commission followed this recommendation and started its first round of con-
sultation in September 1995 on the possible direction of Community action in that 
field, based on Art. 3 of the Social Protocol (European Commission, 1995, p. 5) 
that together with the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 1993. 
Thereby, the Commission invited the social partners to express their views on in-
ter alia, whether they “share the Commission’s view that European regulation of 
the conditions governing part-time, fixed-term and temporary work is necessary” 
(European Commission, 1995, p. 6). The Commission furthermore asked what 
kind of European regulation would be desirable and whether “such action” should 
“simultaneously cover part-time, fixed-term and temporary workers or should 
there be individual action for each of these categories”. Moreover, the Commis-
sion inquired whether the social partners favoured a “comparable treatment be-
tween permanent, full-time employees and part-time, fixed-term and temporary 
workers” in the field of “working conditions, social security and complementary 
social security provision” (European Commission, 1995, p. 6). 
In a second consultation round, in April 1996, the Commission summed up 
the social partners’ responses. Generally, social partners showed to be supportive 
of the Commission’s initiative. While the trade unions “expressed their strong 
support” (European Commission , 1996, p. 2), the employers were more reserved. 
Though doubting the need for EU legislative action, they were also of the opinion 
that “common arrangements” should be in line with the Essen conclusions, 
namely that efforts should be undertaken aiming at “increasing the employment-
intensiveness of growth, in particular by more flexible organisation of work in a 
way which fulfils both the wishes of employees and the requirements of competi-
tion” (European Commission , 1996, p. 2f.). Based on this positive feedback, the 
Commission affirmed that it intended to propose Community legislation and laid 
down its views on the content of a “Community initiative on flexibility in working 
time and security for employees” (European Commission , 1996, p. 4). Instead of 
providing a first draft proposal, the Commission set out a list of principles it con-
sidered important for the regulation of that issue (European Commission , 1996, p. 
4ff.). 
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UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC agreed to take up negotiations with each 
other on atypical work. However, they wanted to negotiate each form of atypical 
employment in separate agreements (Hartenberger, 2001, p. 126). In 1997, they 
reached an agreement on part-time work (European Communities, 1997). In its 
preamble the social partners stressed their will to conclude another agreement 
dealing with fixed-term work. The European Commission officially accepted ESD 
negotiations on fixed-term work on 20 March 1998 (Welz, 2008, p. 404). 
 
Both camps nominated spokespersons. CEEP and UNICE formed a joint negotia-
tion team. Their speaker was Dan McCauley from the Irish Business and Employ-
ers Confederation (Ahlberg, 2000, p. 53). The ETUC chose Jean Lapeyre, then-
deputy general secretary, as its spokesperson (Ahlberg, 2000, p. 54). Both sides 
agreed on Jean Degimbe, former Director General of the DG for Employment, In-
dustrial Relations and Social Affairs (DG V), to chair the negotiations as a neutral 
person. He limited his role to “calling persons to speak, to answer questions di-
rected to him and to occasionally give his view on the interpretation of provisions 
or concepts of EU law” (Ahlberg, 2000, p. 49). All texts were exclusively drafted 
by the negotiation parties’ representatives (Ahlberg, 2000, p. 49). The chair hence 
does not need further attention in the following analysis.  
At the tenth round of negotiations and after two almost-breakdowns of the dia-
logue and after the nine month deadline for ESD negotiations which was about to 
expire the day before Christmas was extended for another three months, manage-
ment and labour reached an agreement on 14 January 1999 (Welz, 2008, p. 404). 
On 28 June 1999 the social partners’ agreement was adopted by the Council and 
transformed into Council Directive 1999/70/EC concerning  the Framework 
Agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (Welz, 
2008, p. 405). 
4.2 Management’s and labour’s general stances on 
fixed-term work contracts 
As management’s and labour’s mandates for negotiations on fixed-term work 
were based on different “logics” (ETUC, 1998a), they had opposing ideal posi-
tions from the start: 
For the UNICE, rules on the abuse of fixed-term contracts by negotiating a non-
discrimination clause – whereby “the necessity to apply a different treatment be-
cause of the temporary nature of the work relation is fully taken into account, and 
that comparable situations are compared” (UNICE mandate, point 4c (UNICE, 
1997)) – would be sufficient because fair conditions of employment would render 
the need of regulating the use of fixed-term contracts unnecessary (ETUC, 1998a; 
Ahlberg, 2000, p. 55). UNICE’s mandate states that its “only [own emphasis] ob-
jective […] shall be to improve employment perspectives by promoting flexibility 
in the labour market and reducing obstacles to the development of fixed-term 
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work, thereby helping the competitiveness of European companies while taking 
into account the position of the workers concerned.” (UNICE mandate, point 3). 
Obstacles were for example seen in “restrictions regarding the conditions under 
which a fixed-term contract may be concluded or ended before the term foreseen, 
etc.” (UNICE mandate, point 4b)). Negotiations shall be restricted to “questions 
which require qualified majority voting under article 2 of the social policy agree-
ment” (UNICE mandate, point 4 e)).  
On contrary, for the ETUC, regulating the use of fixed-term contracts and 
non-discrimination were two separate and necessary features for an agreement on 
fixed-term work (ETUC, 1998a). By putting fixed-term workers on equal footing 
with open-ended contract workers, employers should be prevented from using the 
former in order to avoid obligations they have towards workers of the latter group 
(Ahlberg, 2000, p. 52). Thus, the ETUC’s negotiation mandate entailed a non-
discrimination clause and conditions for the use of fixed-term contracts that 
should lead to a limitation of their conclusion. 
Furthermore, the ETUC demanded the introduction of consultation and informa-
tion rights of employees’ representation bodies – that should also include fixed-
term workers – on the use and development of fixed-term contracts in the com-
pany (ETUC mandate, point 8 (ETUC, 1998)), whereas the UNICE mandate in-
structs its negotiators to avoid the adoption of consultation obligations towards 
employees’ representatives (UNICE mandate, point 4g). 
Moreover, the UNICE’s mandate emphasised the principle of subsidiarity: social 
partners at national level should be granted a role in the implementation of princi-
ples agreed upon at European level (UNICE mandate, point 4d,h). 
4.3 The negotiation process 
Despite their seemingly irreconcilable initial positions and management’s prefer-
ence for Community inactivity in this field of atypical work, how did the social 
partners reach an agreement? In the matters of highest contestation, did they adopt 
one or several of the consensus strategies to do so? And if so, did the shadow of 
hierarchy play a role? 
4.3.1 Regulation of fixed-term work 
By far the biggest stumbling block was the question of whether and how to limit 
the use or abuse of fixed-term contracts. The ETUC saw an urgent need to regu-
late the use of fixed-term work relationships as they were discriminatory “by its 
nature” (“e.g., it affected access to bank loans”) (ETUC, 1998j). Thus, the 
ETUC’s negotiation mandate required clauses on limitation of fixed-term work. 
Each fixed-term work contract should be subject to “[r]easons, justification and 
limits (according to Directive 91/383, replacement for holidays, sabbaticals, ma-
ternity leave, parental leave, dependence on external funding…) on the use of this 
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form of contract” (ETUC mandate, point 8). The use of fixed-term contracts 
should be limited to a maximum period of 3 years (ETUC mandate, point 8) and 
fixed-term contracts may only be renewed twice (ETUC mandate, point 8). In an 
early draft of this clause, the employees made clear that member states shall be 
obliged to make all these three conditions (objective reasons from the first con-
tract on, maximum total duration (3 years), limited total number of renewals (2 
renewals)) binding and cumulative (ETUC, 1998e). 
With these demands, labour’s proposal was quite similar to the 1994 Ger-
man Presidency text. Differences were that according to the German text, member 
states had to ensure at least one of the three conditions but would be free to make 
them cumulative. The 1994 text furthermore stipulated no concrete maximum du-
ration for successive fixed-term employment contracts but left this period to be 
determined by the member state. Moreover, only the conclusion of successive 
contracts but not the first fixed-term relationship required objective reasons. 
Hence, the ETUC’s proposal was of higher regulatory nature. 
On contrary, for the employers, the 1994 texts’ provisions and thus also 
the ETUC’s proposal went too far. They consequentially rejected the German 
Presidency proposal (ETUC, 1998j). By negotiation mandate, management was 
instructed to “promote flexibility in the labour market and reduc[e] obstacles to 
the development of fixed-term work” (UNICE mandate, point 3). Dan McCauley 
argued that European regulation in this area was inacceptable because “any quan-
tification would be arbitrary” and because the “Council would never agree” 
(ETUC, 1998k). 
 
By the end of May, the employers showed some degree of reconcilability. For the 
first time they acknowledged that permanent employment contract were, and 
should remain, the normal standard of the labour market as a whole, while consid-
ering it a necessary feature of employment in certain sectors and/or occupations 
(ETUC, 1998k). At the same time, on 27 May 1998, they drafted a clause on the 
regulation of fixed-term contracts that was comparably vague: member states 
should have the option to impose a maximum duration of successive fixed-term 
work contracts “and the conditions under which they may be renewed” (Employ-
ers’ proposal, 27 May). First time fixed-term contracts would thus remain unregu-
lated. In the employees’ view, this was “very unsatisfactory” (ETUC, 1998k). 
Simultaneously, the employers offered formulations on all other elements of an 
agreement (i.e. definitions, scope, equal treatment/non-discrimination) (ETUC, 
1998d). The ETUC considered this move as an attempt to “sidetrack” the trade 
unions from the issue of regulation (ETUC, 1998k). In response, the ETUC tried 
to “concentrate the employers’ minds further on the question of regulation” and 
drafted new texts focusing on the regulation question and linked to this the pur-
pose of the agreement (ETUC, 1998k). 
Then, by mid-June, the employees showed some willingness to compro-
mise. If the employers accepted the principle of regulation at European level, 
leaving the precise modalities of application to the national and sectoral level 
could be acceptable (ETUC, 1998d). Management reacted to this offer by refer-
ring once more to their proposal of 27 May. Still, this proposition was regarded as 
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insufficient and while referring to its own earlier drafts, the ETUC doubted the 
employers’ willingness to reach a European agreement at all (DGB, 1998). Jean 
Lapeyre repeated the ETUC’s stance that the principle of making fixed-term work 
conditional and introducing limits would be “nonnegotiable”. Solely the way how 
to do it could be discussed. He pointed out that management’s unwillingness to 
compromise would lead to an end of the negotiations (DGB, 1998), and reminded 
the employers on the strengthened role of the European Parliament in social pol-
icy matters since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty: The European Par-
liament would only await an opportunity to “do something better” than the social 
partners (DGB, 1998). 
The following months, the negotiations made no progress. By late Sep-
tember an ETUC document even remarked that “the actual negotiations had not 
yet really begun” (ETUC, 1998d). When the employers internally debated a 
change to the initial negotiation mandate in order to be able to make advances, the 
majority rejected that idea. Rather, the ETUC should continue to pursue its strat-
egy of proposing European principles of regulation that shall be specified at na-
tional level. This strategy however, would have to go along with the principle of 
equal treatment and a non-regression clause, stipulating that a European agree-
ment would not require the lowering of existing higher standards in member states 
(ETUC, 1998d). Recourse to the legislator was seen critically. The ETUC’s Gen-
eral Secretary “warned against placing too high expectations in the possibilities of 
the European Parliament”, the Commission and the Council: the Parliament would 
be occupied with election preparations, the Commission’s “power to act would 
decrease still further bearing in mind that its mandate expired the following year” 
and even though the majority of the Member States were meanwhile led by social 
democrats, it would “in no way mean that the will of the trade unions would be-
come reality in the wink of an eye” (ETUC, 1998d). Rather, instead of stopping 
dialogue or widening the mandate, the November 1994 German Presidency text 
should be aimed at as a possible compromise by the ETUC (ETUC, 1998d).  
During a meeting on 27 and 28 October 1998, the employers made a new 
proposal that “represented a move in the right direction” for the trade unions, but 
was not acceptable anyway (ETUC, 1998m). Management insisted on the mere 
option for Member States to regulate the use of fixed-term work relationships. 
First time contracts should not need objective grounds, while renewals (that are 
not restricted in number) might. But when member states “have objective reasons 
for fixed-term work, there is no need for any other regulation” (ETUC, 1998m). 
Furthermore, the employers demanded for the introduction of a new bone of con-
tention: company-level derogations by so-called “workforce agreements” (ETUC, 
1998m). These derogations would have disempowered national trade unions at 
sectoral and intersectoral level by exemption clauses hitherto made by collective 
agreements being replaced by individual contracts with non-unionised workers. It 
was thus completely unacceptable for the ETUC (ETUC, 1998a; ETUC, 1998l). 
 
During the negotiation round on 12 and 13 November 1998 the ESD on fixed-
term work was close to its first breakdown. The ETUC made a new proposal on 
the issue of regulation, going down with its demands so that it almost “risked un-
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derbidding even the last proposal of the German presidency of 1994” (Ahlberg, 
2000, p. 57) that was regarded as the minimum: Not all fixed-term contracts 
would have to be based on objective grounds, but only renewals. Furthermore, it 
no more demanded specific quantifications for the number of renewals and the to-
tal duration of fixed-term work. The cumulative nature of the conditions should be 
upheld in a way that objective grounds and at least one more condition must be 
fulfilled (Ahlberg, 2000, p. 57). Moreover, the possibility for derogations negoti-
ated by the social partners for sectors particularly concerned by specific and cycli-
cal work patterns were offered (ETUC, 1998a). 
The employers stipulated that member states should only be obliged to one of the 
conditions restricting the use of fixed-term contracts and it should be provided for 
the possibility of workforce agreements (ETUC, 1998n). While the ETUC consid-
ered its own proposal to be “a little better than the Council text [of 1994] and 
would represent added-value”, the employers’ suggestions were evaluated as 
“well inferior to the Council text of November 1994” (ETUC, 1998n). 
Seeing no common ground for agreement, the labour unionists doubted the 
employers’ willingness to compromise and announced that they would ask the 
ETUC Steering Committee on 19 November whether negotiations should con-
tinue (Ahlberg, 2000, p. 58).  
During the Steering Committee it was expressed that “given the deregulation 
which has occurred since [1994] in numerous countries” the standards of the then-
German Presidency proposal “would not necessarily be maintained” (ETUC, 
1998a). Consequentially, the dialogue should be upheld with the 1994 Council 
text constituting “an acceptable minimum basis” (ETUC, 1998i).  
Only some days later, at the next negotiation round on 26 and 27 Novem-
ber 1998, dialogue was about to collapse again. The ETUC conceded to manage-
ment’s demands by dropping its own request to make the conditions for fixed-
term work contracts cumulative. Management’s insistence upon the inclusion of 
company-level derogations was unbroken (Ahlberg, 2000, p. 58). Again, the trade 
union representatives saw now common ground for agreement and announced that 
they would recommend the ETUC’s Executive Committee that was about to meet 
on 14 and 15 December 1998 that the legislator should take over, if employers did 
not change their position until then (Ahlberg, 2000, p. 58). 
On 4 December 1998, the presidents and the general secretary of UNICE, 
CEEP and ETUC met during a “social dialogue mini-summit” which had nothing 
to do with the negotiations on fixed-term work. However, these persons agreed 
that further efforts should be undertaken in order to reach an agreement on that is-
sue and urged the spokespersons to talk to each other. Jean Lapeyre and Dan 
McCauley met on 10 December 1998 and drafted a new regulation clause that 
contained no reference to the first contract, leaves no room for company-level 
derogations and makes the introduction of “one or more” conditions for fixed-
term contracts obligatory (Ahlberg, 2000, p. 58f.; ETUC, 1998h; ETUC, 1998l). 
Both spokespersons had to present this proposal to their respective organisations 
and get approval of the result. When no response had reached the ETUC until 14 
December 1998, the Executive Committee debated the prospects of Community 
legislation in case that dialogue fails if the employers do not signal their agree-
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ment in principle until noon the next day. The assembly had “no great optimism” 
about an initiative by the legislator, “since the Commission was clearly not in-
clined to take action in such a matter” (ETUC, 1998a). But even if it should trig-
ger the legislative process, the 1994 text was not expected to be the starting point. 
Rather, the Committee estimated that “[t]his situation was likely to deteriorate” 
(ETUC, 1998a). 
However, the next day, the employers responded with a revised text, including 
some words whose interpretation puzzled the ETUC. In the trade unionists opin-
ion these changes of words might allow again for workforce agreements. In the 
employers view, the newly introduced words were “neutral phraseology” (ETUC, 
1998l). Despite this conundrum, the Executive Committee considered that the 
employers’ position had changed sufficiently in order to take this proposal as a re-
starting point and to resume ESD (ETUC, 1998l). As the negotiation deadline was 
about to expire, both parties requested the Commission to extend the deadline for 
another three months. The final negotiation round should take place from 11 to 15 
January 1999. The social partners, however, already came to an agreement by 14 
January 1999 (Ahlberg, 2000, p. 59).  
The final agreement pretty much looks like the text agreed on 10 Decem-
ber 1998. Member States shall only be obliged to regulate successive fixed-term 
work contracts (clause 5.1). First time contracts of this kind thus remain unregu-
lated. The three conditions as demanded by the ETUC are enlisted in the final 
agreement. Member States have to put in place “one or more” of them (clause 
5.1). Thus, cumulating conditions for successive fixed-term work contracts is pos-
sible. Only renewal(s) of these contracts requires objective reasons (clause 5.1a)). 
The maximum total duration and the number of renewals of fixed-term work con-
tracts are not specified by the agreement but to be decided by the member states 
themselves (clause 5.1b) and c)). The text does not provide for workforce agree-
ments. 
 
Comparing the final agreement on this clause and the negotiators’ reference text, 
the German Presidency proposal of November 1994, the consensus strategy of 
elimination clearly prevailed. 
First of all, the scope of the provision was reduced by including an objec-
tive for this clause: “to prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed-
term employment contracts or relationships” (clause 5.1 of Council Directive 
1999/70/EC (European Communities, 1999)). The 1994 text did not provide any 
specific objective in that clause. 
The scope was further limited by adding some conditions to be met before 
member states and/or social partners shall impose regulation on successive con-
tracts. Firstly, this shall only happen “where there are no equivalent legal meas-
ures to prevent abuse” (clause 5.1). Secondly, measures shall be introduced “in a 
manner which takes account of the needs of specific sectors and/or categories of 
workers” (clause 5.1).   
While the final agreement upholds the three possible restrictions already proposed 
by the 1994 text, objective grounds, maximum total duration and maximum num-
ber of renewals, it makes the latter two less specific by not providing any quanti-
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fication but leaving this to member states and/or social partners (clause 5.1 a)-c)). 
The strategy of elimination through imprecision was thus applied. 
A remarkable change to the reference text is the addition of the role played 
by the social partners in the implementation of this clause: The German Presi-
dency’s regulation clause did not mention the social partners. In the final agree-
ment however, member states shall regulate conditions for the successive use of 
fixed-term contracts, but only “after consultation with social partners in accor-
dance with national law, collective agreement or practice”. But also the social 
partners themselves shall be able to regulate in this field as stipulated by the 
agreement (clause 5.1). The special role of the social partners in the implementa-
tion and application of the agreement is furthermore emphasised in point 12 of the 
non-binding general considerations of the agreement. The addition of this element 
accounts again for the elimination strategy, this time by increasing ambiguity, be-
cause the enhanced role of social partners increases the discretion of implementa-
tion at national level. While the trade unions hope to use their negotiation power 
at national and sectoral level to “actively make use of the agreement in order to 
valorize its contents to the greatest extent possible” (ETUC, 1999), the employers 
expected a “hopefully liberal interpretation” for the implementation at national 
level (Clauwaert, 2001, p. 380). 
Some compensation strategy can be found: While clause 5 only aims at 
regulating successive fixed-term contracts, point seven of the general considera-
tions states that “the use of fixed-term contracts based on objective reasons is a 
way to prevent abuse”. According to the ETUC, objective reasons thus also have 
to be provided for the first fixed-term contract (ETUC, 1998f). But as the general 
considerations do not have legally binding character, the value of this notion is 
questionable. 
All in all, this clause in the social partners’ agreement is quite similar to 
the German Presidency text of 1994. Through its reduced specificity however, its 
regulatory nature can be seen as being slightly below the German proposal. 
4.3.2 Non-discrimination of fixed-term workers 
The second biggest obstacle was the question of a non-discrimination clause, or 
quality of fixed-term work, as it was also called. This issue relates to the question 
to what extend fixed-term workers should enjoy certain rights as permanent work-
ers.  
In contrast to the regulation negotiations, the point of orientation was not 
the 1994 German Presidency text but the clause on non-discrimination from the 
European part-time work agreement concluded by the social partners the year be-
fore. Early on, Jean Lapeyre pointed out that there could be no agreement with 
equal treatment standards below the one agreed upon during the part-time work 
negotiations (ETUC, 1998c). 
Yet the ETUC was aiming at reaching an even higher level of equal treat-
ment. For the trade union representatives it was clear that fixed-timers should not 
be treated less favourable than permanent workers related to “supplementary 
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benefits such as complementary social protection schemes and continuing voca-
tional training” (ETUC mandate, point 8). Only on objective grounds, meaning 
“grounds allowing different treatment, where such treatment corresponds to the 
real need to achieve a stated objective and is necessary for and appropriate to the 
achievement of that objective”, different treatment was justified (ETUC proposal, 
30 June). 
Management opted for a more open and less stricter clause, because “the necessity 
to apply a different treatment because of the temporary nature of the work rela-
tion” must be fully taken into account (UNICE mandate, point 4c). However, by 
tabling a proposal that equals the 1997 text’s clause, the employers signalled that 
they could live with the part-time agreement’s clause. It allows for derogations on 
“objective grounds”, without specifying what these are (employers’ proposal, 27 
May). Member States should be allowed to make “access to particular conditions 
of employment” dependent on a number of requirements: “period of service, time 
worked or earnings qualification” (employers’ proposal, 27 May). 
Furthermore, the principle of pro rata temporis should apply (employers’ pro-
posal, 27 May), meaning that certain dividable rights such as pay and duration of 
holiday have to be granted proportionally to the length of employment in relation 
to the period of assessment (Riesenhuber, 2009, p. 16). 
 
As described earlier, the principle of non-discrimination originally was regarded 
as a sufficient regulatory feature by the employers to prevent abuse of fixed-term 
work contracts. However, the ETUC managed to focus the early negotiations on 
the question of regulation.  
But by the second half of the negotiation period, the non-discrimination principle 
came back on the agenda more prominently when the employees recognised that 
they have to be more flexible on the question of the regulation clause (proposing a 
mere principle of regulation that will have to be specified at national level by 
member states and social partners). This flexibility in the regulation issue should 
be counterbalanced by a non-discrimination clause (ETUC, 1998a; ETUC, 
1998d).  
 The final result was clause 4 that almost equalled the one of the 1997 part-
time work agreement in that different treatment of permanent and fixed-term 
workers can only be justified on objective grounds and that the pro rata temporis 
principle shall apply. The specific application of the measures shall be defined by 
the member states and/or the social partners. Compared to the 1997 agreement, 
however, the principle of non-discrimination was strengthened by removing some 
conditionality for the access to certain rights. In the fixed-term work agreement, it 
was acknowledged, that period of service qualifications shall be the same for 
fixed-term workers as for permanent workers. Only on objective grounds this 
principle should not apply. Thus, restrictions to access of certain rights on grounds 
of period of service, seniority or earnings qualifications as stipulated in the part-
time work agreement were abandoned (ETUC, 1998g).  
Quality of fixed-term work was further moved in the directions of ETUC’s 
demands by clause 6 “which opens up possibilities of continuing vocational train-
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ing, career development and access by fixed-term workers to permanent posi-
tions” (ETUC, 1998g). 
The employers however could make a point in preventing the inclusion of 
complementary social protection schemes into the agreement – a discriminatory 
element of high importance to the ETUC. During the last negotiation round, the 
social partners acknowledged that occupational pension schemes shall not form 
part of this agreement but shall be subject of subsequent ESD negotiations for a 
framework promoting the transferability of such schemes in an increasingly more 
fragmented labour market (Ahlberg, 2000, p. 56; ETUC, 1998g; ETUC, 1999b). 
 
Regarding the classification of consensus strategies applied in this question, a 
combination of elimination and compensation is visible. On the one hand, the 
grounds for restricting access to certain rights are eliminated compared to the 
1997 text. At the same time, this elimination is substituted by the recognition that 
period of service qualifications necessary to claim certain rights shall be the same 
for fixed-term workers as for permanent workers, only to be restricted on objec-
tive grounds.  Thereby, a new concept was introduced that weighs heavier than 
the elimination, thus characterising this modification as compensation.  
Compensation furthermore was applied in the agreement’s purpose clause 
by explicitly emphasising the objective of the agreement to ensure non-
discrimination of fixed-term workers. Whereas the 1994 text broadly and inspeci-
fically formulates that the purpose „is to protect fixed-term employees”, the social 
partners’ agreement lists two separate purposes: improvement of “the quality of 
fixed-term work by ensuring the application of the principle of non-
discrimination” and the prevention of “abuse arising from the use of successive 
fixed-term employment contracts or relationships”.  
4.3.3 Other issues 
Similarly as with the matter of supplementary pension schemes, the negotiators 
proceeded with issues on information and consultation of worker representatives 
and on temporary agency work.  
On the former topic the ETUC initially took the stance that worker representative 
bodies shall be “informed and consulted by employers in advance of any planned 
use of fixed-term contracts or relations in the undertaking and the justifications for 
such use and/or renewal” (ETUC proposal, 11 June) and that worker representa-
tive bodies shall get an annual report of the development of all forms of work con-
tracts in the undertaking (ETUC proposal, 11 June). The employers opposed this 
position. Their negotiation team was instructed to “not impose obligations, or new 
obligations, on employers as regards the consultation of employee representa-
tives” (UNICE mandate, point 4g). The German Presidency proposal would have 
been on the employees’ side: it stipulated for an obligation to provide workers’ 
representative bodies with an annual report of the development of fixed-term 
work in the undertaking and the possibility to provide for provisions of workers’ 
  37 
representative bodies’ involvement before a fixed-term employee is taken on 
(German Presidency Proposal, clause 6).  
However, as there was a separate proposal on a Directive on information 
and consultation before the Council, the social partners agreed to “put aside many 
of the aspects” concerned with it (ETUC, 1999c; ETUC, 1999b). Consequentially 
the result of the final agreement on that clause is only of recommendatory charac-
ter and reads very vague and imprecise: “As far as possible, employers should 
give consideration to the provision of appropriate information to existing workers’ 
representative bodies about fixed-term work in the undertaking” (clause 6.2). 
Hence, the consensus strategy of elimination by increasing ambiguity was applied. 
 
The issue of temporary agency work was not an affair too important for neither 
camp. UNICE’s mandate only provided for the negotiation of fixed-term work. 
ETUC’s definition of fixed-term work indirectly excluded temporary agency 
work. Nevertheless, some sections within the ETUC wanted to negotiate the mat-
ter within the fixed-term work dialogue. However, when sectoral labour unions 
and sectoral employers’ organisations mostly affected by temporary agency work 
sent a joint-letter to the negotiation spokesperson arguing for an exclusion of this 
topic because it required specific rules and should thus be dealt with in a separate 
agreement, the item was dropped from the agenda (Ahlberg, 2000, p. 55). 
4.3.4 Assessment of the final agreement by the social partners 
In general, the negotiating parties were satisfied with the final result. There were 
some voices within the ETUC claiming that the difference between the negotia-
tion mandate and the final agreement’s clause on regulation was too large and that 
the agreement was below the 1994 text. Nevertheless, the majority within the 
ETUC acknowledged that the “current political context” would not make it “real-
istic to expect ‘maximalist’ agreements or legislation” (ETUC, 1999a). Thus, fol-
lowing the maxim ‘you can’t always get what you want, but you get what you 
need’, the main line was that, all in all, the final result was close to the last Ger-
man Presidency proposal – an evaluation that is supported by Hartenberger’s 
(2001, p. 126) assessment of the regulatory intensiveness of both texts – and must 
be seen “as a victory for the ETUC”, especially considering the reluctant initial 
mandate of the employers (ETUC, 1998g). Even though it was only “minimum 
social regulation” it would help to limit social dumping and protect standards in 
more advanced countries (ETUC, 1999a) and that the agreement meant “in several 
ways a big improvement for [fixed-term] workers” (ETUC, 1999c). 
Furthermore, by both sides the agreement was seen as an important step in devel-
oping the European social dialogue as a whole: it contributed towards “creating a 
European negotiation area” (ETUC, 1999a) while failure could have meant “the 
possible end of interprofessional European negotiations” (ETUC, 1998g). 
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4.4 The influence of the shadow of hierarchy on the 
fixed-term work agreement’s content 
So, what does this narrative of the fixed-term work negotiations reveal about the 
hypothesised link between the shadow of hierarchy and the final agreement’s con-
tent? 
It becomes clear that a shadow was cast on the dialogue, mostly during the 
negotiations on the regulation clause. At some points the employers argued that 
the Council would not accept Europe-set quantifications of fixed-term work re-
strictions; the employees reminded management to recall the European Parlia-
ment’s role in social policy decision-making if social partner negotiations failed 
and they openly threatened to take recourse to the ordinary legislative route if em-
ployers would not show willingness to compromise.  
The shadow also manifested in the expectations about what a Council Directive 
might look like if social partners failed to agree. For the regulation clause this was 
the last German Presidency proposal of 1994. There is clear evidence that the util-
ity gains of all proposals put forward by the negotiation parties were consciously 
measured against this text.  
Still, even though the 1994 text was the reference point, and despite it hav-
ing been declared the acceptable minimum by the ETUC, the final regulation 
standards of clause 5 were slightly below that of the German proposal, resulting 
from an application of the elimination strategy. There were processes that contrib-
uted to this outcome and that hint at the necessity to adjust the model deduced in 
this paper’s first part: a lack of faith in the legislator if dialogue collapses, a still 
comparably good end result due to some compromise in other parts of the agree-
ment and flexibility in the provisions’ national implementation. Apparently, on 
the ETUC’s side, there was some degree of uncertainty regarding the assessment 
of the shadow of hierarchy: firstly, there were doubts if the Commission will 
really initiate Council negotiations on that matter in case the social partners failed, 
and secondly, there was scepticism about whether the standards of 1994 would be 
upheld in re-started Council negotiations. Taking these uncertainties into account, 
it required the labour unions to make concessions towards management: For the 
employers, this outcome was made agreeable by increasing the ambiguity of the 
provision’s implementation prospects via strengthening the social partners’ role at 
national and sectoral level in this process and by leaving quantifications of limita-
tions to the discretion of the member states. For the ETUC, not knowing precisely 
what Community legislation would look like, increasing imprecision of the regu-
lation clause (thus using elimination) was acceptable and making it a good result 
anyway, especially when also comparing it with the employers’ mandate that 
originally urged for the exclusion of that question during the negotiations. 
Moreover, despite the low regulation standard compared to the 1994 pro-
posal, the agreement was made bearable for the ETUC by strengthening the non-
discrimination clause.  
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In that case not the 1994 text, but the provision on non-discrimination from the 
1997 social partners’ agreement on part-time work was the reference point. The 
ETUC, while opting for a higher standard, made clear that it would not go below 
that level. The employers early signalled their readiness to accept the 1997 stan-
dards. When the negotiations were widened by the second half of the negotiation 
period, and other questions than the regulation clause were accepted on the 
agenda by both sides, more flexibility in the regulation clause (making conces-
sions to the employers) was traded for strengthening the 1997 standards on non-
discrimination (making concessions to the employees). This was done by intro-
ducing the concept of same period of work qualifications for fixed-term as for 
permanent workers and by making the principle of non-discrimination, as well as 
of regulation, more explicit in the agreement’s purpose clause than it was in the 
German Presidency proposal. Thus, intra-agreement compensation took place 
through a package deal. 
Apart from the recognition of same period of service qualifications, other 
efforts to add new concepts to the 1994 text (compensation strategy) were blocked 
by the respective other side. Management’s demand for workforce agreements 
was neglected by labour right away. Initiatives for including the issues of com-
plementary social protection schemes, information and consolation of workers’ 
representatives and temporary agency work were put off by opening the perspec-
tive to start separate negotiations on these matters. This move in turn, increased 
the incentive to conclude an agreement on fixed-term work contracts because it 
would increase the legislator’s faith in the ability of the social partners to reach 
agreements also on these discarded questions and it would, in the words of the 
ETUC, force the employers to acknowledge their own responsibility as a social 
partner. 
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5 The data answer: refining the initial 
model  
Concluding, the purpose of this study and its placement in the scholarly literature 
will briefly be recapitulated. Enabling a dialogue between theory and data, re-
finements of the initial model will be proposed based on the empirical analysis’ 
findings. Finally, an assessment of the study’s validity of the claimed cause-effect 
relationship and its generalisability, especially taking the model’s refinements into 
account, will be made. 
5.1 The initial model 
While it was widely acknowledged that the shadow of hierarchy, that is the threat 
of unbeneficial Community legislation, is important for making social partners en-
ter the European social dialogue, this paper aimed at presenting a theoretical con-
cept to understand the hitherto omitted question of how the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ 
in European social dialogue influences the content of European social partners’ 
collective agreements. Therefore, a game theoretical model of European labour 
and management interaction in Commission-initiated and Council-implemented 
collective agreements (COCOCAs) based on the assumption of actors reacting ra-
tionally within institutional constraints to their opponents’ moves was deduced 
from literature on European governance and rational choice. It was argued that 
European social dialogue consists of governance structures and governance proc-
esses that are inextricably interlinked, whereas the former influences the latter and 
consequentially the content of social partners’ negotiations in ESD. 
Governance structures were specified with the help of rational choice in-
stitutionalism: ESD negotiations were conceptualised as veto games, where the 
ETUC, UNICE and CEEP can break down the negotiations at any time if they 
perceive themselves to be better-off with the Commission proposal and what they 
expect the Council to make of it than with what the other side of industry offers. 
This is what was previously called the shadow of hierarchy, or the shadow of the 
law. For veto games, this concept was re-named ‘default outcome’ in this paper. 
The social partners thus have to reach unanimity to adopt a collective agreement. 
Hence, the veto game approach points out that the social partners would only 
reach an agreement when a new proposal is more utility maximising for both sides 
of industry than the default outcome. Hence, a ‘winset’ must be existent. 
At the same time, the ESD rules and practices delineate the governance 
processes that allow the social partners some leeway to modify the proposals to a 
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certain degree so as to make it agreeable – hence more utility maximising than the 
default outcome – for both sides. From integrative bargaining theory and based on 
the assumption that most policies are dividable and that most political disputes 
consist of multiple underlying policy dimensions, three consensus strategies were 
identified that can be applied in order to make a proposal more utility maximising 
than the default outcome for both sides and thus mutually agreeable by creating or 
increasing a winset for the veto players: compromise, compensation and elimina-
tion. Integrative bargaining theory hence helps to explain how an agreement can 
be reached while taking into account vastly opposing preferences of the social 
partners in the beginning of negotiations and the institution-induced omnipresent 
possibility of negotiation failure that goes along with these differences. 
The application of these consensus strategies does not happen arbitrarily 
but is influenced by the shadow of hierarchy that looms over the negotiations. A 
causal chain of mechanisms was identified that says that social partners compare 
their potential utility gains from the default outcome with the benefits they would 
obtain from the respective other side of industry’s proposals. The shadow there-
fore is the reference point for utility calculations and consequentially impacts so-
cial partners’ decision whether to uphold the dialogue or whether to defect. 
Through the mechanism-based approach, the model thus connects structure with 
strategies by arguing that social partners chose (a mix of) consensus strategies in 
such a way that the final text on the table is more utility maximising for both sides 
than the default outcome and thus makes adoption of a negotiated agreement more 
desirable for management and labour than resorting to the fall-back regulatory op-
tion of Community legislation. 
5.2 Refining the model and suggestions for further 
research 
Guided by and analysed through this deductively formulated game theoretical 
model, an analytic narrative of the processes of the 1998/99 ESD negotiations on 
fixed-term work contracts, leading to the adoption of a Council Directive on that 
matter, was provided.  
 The narrative offered clear evidence that the social partners perceived a 
shadow of hierarchy and that they made assessments of what a default outcome in 
this shadow might look like. The default outcome constituted the reference point 
for the negotiators. Thus, by and large, the model’s assumptions about how 
mechanisms of expected utility for the social partners in COCOCAs influence the 
agreements’ content were confirmed. However, as the intention was to enable a 
“dialogue between theory and data” (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosenthal, & Weingast, 
1998), the fixed-term work negotiation’s analysis revealed that the initial model 
must be refined. 
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Firstly, it appears that there is not the shadow of law looming over ESD negotia-
tions. Rather, a multitude of shadows are operating simultaneously in different 
sections of one agreement, influencing the actors’ utility calculations and thus 
which consensus strategies to adopt. The notion of ‘shadow of hierarchy’ used in 
this paper so far can be divided in two analytically distinguishable shadows: a) a 
‘shadow of initiative’ making the social partners wonder whether the legislator, 
hence the Commission and the Council, really intends to become active in case 
their negotiations fail; and b) a proper ‘shadow of the law’ posing the question 
what social partners expect the legislator to do with the policy content-wise if la-
bour and management dialogue collapses.  
The shadow of initiative is to be placed in the action-formation mechanism where 
the social partners evaluate how realistic the emergence of the default outcome is 
at all. If its emergence is evaluated as being sufficiently realistic, the shadow of 
the law looms over the situational mechanism, where the default outcome forms 
one alternative proposal to the other social partners’ propositions. These two 
shadows always have to be present in all COCOCAs that were concluded by the 
social partners. 
As the social partners’ reference to parts of the 1997 part-time work 
agreement has shown, the ESD can additionally operate in a ‘shadow of previous 
similar agreements’. If there had been previous agreements by the social partners 
for the regulation of similar policies, these agreements cast their shadow on the 
situational mechanism because they show an alternative, namely what has previ-
ously been minimally possible to agree upon by the social partners on similar top-
ics. Current proposals are then assessed against this shadow.  
But there can also be a ‘shadow of future agreements’, or “industrial rela-
tion considerations” (Falkner, 2003): firstly, labour and management want to 
prove their ability to conclude agreements in order to legitimise their privileged 
involvement in European social and labour law in general. Secondly, concluding 
an agreement on one issue raises the hope to start negotiations on similar topics or 
items that were discarded from the successful agreement’s agenda during the ne-
gotiation process.  
This shadow lays over the action-formation mechanism as it makes the negotia-
tion parties wonder whether accepting a proposal by the other side that is less util-
ity maximising than the default outcome can be outweighed by a realistic perspec-
tive for more successful negotiations on (similar) policies in the future. In that 
sense, ESD negotiations can be part of “nested games” (Tsebelis, 1990) where 
suboptimal outcomes in an agreement are accepted when there is the perspective 
of more successful subsequent negotiations. 
Finally, a ‘shadow of valorisation’ can be cast on ESD negotiations: 
Rather disadvantaging European provisions can be acceptable when their imple-
mentation grants discretion to member states and/or social partners at national or 
sectoral level and if the disadvantaged European federation believes it can influ-
ence the implementation process because it possess more negotiation and imple-
mentation strength at those levels to do so. It thus operates in the action-formation 
mechanisms because it makes the social partners evaluate the utility gains of the 
proposals on the table in the light of the means and practices available to them at 
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national and sectoral level for implementing the agreement in a way more favour-
able to oneself.   
A schematic depiction of the refined model can be found in figure 6. 
 
Figure 6. Social mechanisms and shadows in European Social Dialogue’s Com-
mission-initiated and Council-implemented Collective Agreements  
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Secondly, the factor of uncertainty was unduly neglected in the initial model and 
should be integrated in the micro level action-formation mechanism where it af-
fects the evaluation of utility gains of alternative proposals. This factor features 
most prominently under the ‘shadow of initiative’ and the ‘shadow of law’. It de-
termines these shadows intensity: Not being exactly sure about whether the legis-
lator would become active and what it would do with a policy in case of ESD 
breakdown requires the party that has more interests in striking an ESD deal – 
usually the employees – to take a more flexible stance because its option to take 
recourse to the legislator becomes less threatening to the less-inclined side. Uncer-
tainty might even gain more analytic importance for ESD negotiations that took 
place after the fixed-term work dialogue because after these negotiations, policies 
were not any more previously discussed in the Social Affairs Council, which 
makes “the ‘shadow of the law’ [...] less easily visible” (Falkner, 2003, p. 25). 
 
The third refinement concerns the use of veto suspension strategies and thus what 
influences the shape of the final agreement. Knowledge about which shadow 
dominates in which section of the agreement to be negotiated helps explaining 
why the one or the other consensus strategy was chosen.  
The shadow of hierarchy, hence ‘the shadow of initiative’ and the ‘shadow of law’ 
taken together, does not forecast the choice of consensus strategies. This study 
supports previous findings that the shadow of hierarchy’s existence is necessary to 
make the social partners enter and stay in social dialogue. They only do so if the 
threat of legislation (shadow of initiative) is credible enough, and if each side of 
industry believes that they can achieve something better than the default outcome 
(shadow of the law). The shadow of hierarchy hence forms a reference frame 
within which additional shadows can operate and it provides orientation for utility 
gain calculations in the diverse shadows. 
Apparently, elimination, more precisely elimination through imprecision 
or increasing ambiguity, is the most dominantly used strategy. The conclusion that 
elimination strategy by increased ambiguity, or flexibility, is paramount fits the 
observations made by Bercusson (1992), Keller and Sörries (1999) and Keller 
(2003) as described in the introduction. This paper contributed to specify why. 
The ‘shadow of future agreements’ and the ‘shadow of valorisation’ are prevent-
ing compensation and are obviously promoting the utilisation of increasing ambi-
guity. Elimination by discarding issues altogether did not take place.  
Compensation was most remarkably used through inter-agreement trade, 
whereby concessions in one clause were redressed by compromises in others. It 
took place in the ‘shadow of previous similar agreements’, as this shadow pre-
sented what once constituted the mutually acceptable minimum standard and thus 
builds a barrier against the use of the elimination strategy that would lower these 
standards and apparently can even work as a spring board for issue expansion by 
compensation.  
Large-scale compensation in the form of including new items into the agreement 
did not happen. On the contrary, efforts to add new concepts were regularly 
blocked by one side of industry or the other. That the compensation strategy is 
unlikely to be widely used appears plausible, taking the social partners’ divergent 
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approaches towards the ESD into account: why should employers permit the em-
ployees to add issues to European agreements when their primary goal is to totally 
prevent European regulation? Also, when employers are against European regula-
tion in general, extra items that they want to add to the negotiation agenda and to 
get enshrined in Community law are probably rather rare.   
 
More research should be spent on developing clearer methods for the identifica-
tion of the consensus strategies: During the analysis, the methodological danger of 
missing the compromise strategy was evident. It was most difficult to distinguish 
between compromise strategy and elimination strategy by increasing imprecision. 
Alternatively, the findings suggest, that compromise as a specific consensus strat-
egy might even be discarded altogether. Instead, one might discuss whether ‘com-
promise’ might rather be a generic term, being a result of a mix of elimination and 
compensation strategies.  
Moreover, further research should scrutinise whether these observations of which 
strategy is used under which circumstances, were only singular phenomena in this 
specific case or whether they are part of a more general trend. Therefore, more 
case studies of successful COCOCA negotiations entailing different combinations 
of shadows could be conducted. 
5.3 Internal and external validity 
These considerations pose the question of generalisability of this study’s findings. 
However, first they need to be assessed in terms of validity of the claimed cause-
effect relationship because it does not make sense to ask whether the results hold 
for cases outside the one examined, “unless we are confident that it does therein” 
(Guala, 2003, p. 1198). 
 
According to Shadish et al. (2002, p. 53), “the term internal validity [refers] to in-
ferences about whether observed covariation between A and B reflects a causal re-
lationship from A to B in the form in which the variables were manipulated or 
measured.” A causal relationship can only be established if a) X precedes Y, b) X 
correlates with Y, and 3) the relationship between X and Y cannot be explained in 
terms of some third variable (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002, p. 6). Through 
process-tracing, a comprehensive storyline was told wherein the model passed 
hoop tests and whereby smoking guns, confessions and additional causal factors 
were identified. These process-tracing techniques provided a dense description of 
the connection between X and Y with its intervening steps. Thus, as the analytical 
narrative enhanced the faith that processes were at work as hypothesised in the 
model, the internal validity of this study is high.  
 
Obtaining a high degree of internal validity through a single case study goes at the 
expense of external validity, concerning the question whether findings can be 
generalised to a larger population that was not examined (Ondercin, 2004). How-
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ever, the aim was not to make propositions about all ESD negotiations, but only 
about the fairly specific ESD procedures leading to Commission-initiated and 
Council-implemented collective agreements at European level. In order to provide 
for a broader generalisability to these negotiations, the case under investigation 
was carefully selected: firstly, the selection of a least-likely case enables ‘Sinatra 
inferences’ and secondly were the negotiations on fixed-term work based on the 
most essential cleavage of labour and capital conflict, namely flexibility versus 
security. It can thus be expected that many other negotiations revolve around 
these lines of conflict and make findings from the fixed-term work negotiations 
valuable for the analysis of other dialogues, also at sectoral level. 
However, the identification of additional shadows demonstrates that COCOCA 
results can be influenced by rather case-specific factors: While the shadow of hi-
erarchy, composed of the ‘shadow of initiative’ and the ‘shadow of law’, is al-
ways present in COCOCAs (though their intensity can vary, as the factor of ‘un-
certainty’ described above indicates), the presence and intensity of the ‘shadow of 
previous similar agreements’, the ‘shadow of future agreements’ and the ‘shadow 
of valorisation’ are very case specific.  
The question of generalisability should hence be seen from a ‘realistic evaluation’ 
point of view in taking the role of varying contexts and its impact on outcomes 
into consideration (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). Consequentially, because the possi-
bility of the existence of different combinations of mechanisms must be taken into 
account, the process-tracing results allow drawing ‘possibilistic generalisations’ 
for middle-range theorising (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 22): “knowledge about 
causal configurations (combinations [own emphasis] of causal conditions or social 
mechanisms) that make specific outcomes possible” (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, 
p. 31). 
The refined model is hence based on the assumed existence of ‘causal complexity’ 
entailing equifinality (there can be more than one sufficient condition for an out-
come), conjunctural causation (taken solely, a condition might not have an effect 
on an outcome but only if taken in combination with one or more other condi-
tions) and asymmetric causality (the absence of a condition that led to a specific 
outcome in one case does not automatically mean the non-existence of the out-
come in the other case) (Wagemann & Schneider, 2010, p. 384f.). 
Accepting the theory’s middle-range nature,  one can meet Green’s and Shapiro’s 
(1994, p. 41) claim that rational choice – and hence the model developed in this 
paper as rational choice micro-mechanisms are key here – is lacking in making 
good predictions. Rather, this paper claims, one should use rational choice theo-
ries and consequentially the model developed in this thesis to “explain even if 
they cannot predict” (Hindmoor, 2006, p. 212).1 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1
 I wish to thank Magnus Jerneck for his critical advice during the thesis-writing process. I also would 
like to thank Aline Hoffmann and Stefan Clauwaert from the European Trade Union Institute for 
granting me access to the material used in the empirical analysis of this thesis.    
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